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Social Contagion: When Behaviors Are Also Transmitted

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From obesity to suicide, including violence, self-harm, and certain collective behaviors, scientific research has shown that our behavior is influenced by the people around us. But experts caution: talking about “social contagion” does not mean that a behavior is mechanically transmitted from one person to another.

There are behaviors that seem to spread as if they were a disease. One person begins a certain behavior, and shortly thereafter, others in their circle do something similar. This can happen among a group of friends, at a school, within a community, or—with extraordinary amplifying power—on social media. Because of this, it is difficult to understand how millions of people follow radical ideologies that curtail women’s rights or nullify human rights in countries with a clearly Muslim or communist ideology (Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russia, China, etc.).

The term “social contagion” attempts to describe precisely this phenomenon: the possibility that certain ideas, emotions, attitudes, or behaviors spread through social relationships. Hence, the internet—due to its rapid development and integration with new forms of communication—has become a tool that those in power use to manipulate people. The aim is to influence voting behavior, generate consumer trends, create habits, instill new ideas, and so on.

But the word “contagion” can be misleading. There is no psychological virus that automatically spreads from one person to another. What does exist is a complex combination of imitation, learning, peer pressure, identification, social norms, and repeated exposure. All of this creates such a powerful spectrum of manipulation that very few people are able to resist it.

One of the researchers who has contributed most to the study of this phenomenon is Nicholas Christakis, a physician and sociologist at Harvard University, who, together with political scientist James Fowler, has spent years investigating how human social networks can influence behaviors as diverse as obesity, smoking, cooperation, and happiness. Their work suggests that certain phenomena can spread through the existing connections between people like a perfectly woven spider’s web. We all know we’re living within that web, but even though we’re aware of being trapped, we tend to believe that “we’re in control.”

Christakis and Fowler even proposed the existence of what they called a “three-degrees” influence: certain behaviors may be linked to people located even several steps away within a social network. However, the researchers themselves emphasize a fundamental point: demonstrating that two behaviors are correlated within a network does not automatically prove causality. Although, given the penetration of certain social spheres (political, religious, business, etc.) into social media and the mass media, it is becoming increasingly rare to find the limits of the manipulation they exert over us and to discover even small glimpses of personal freedom.

SOCIAL CONTAGION IS NOT A DISEASE. But it disguises itself very well.

The distinction is important.

When we speak of social contagion, we are not claiming that a person loses their ability to make decisions simply because another person has engaged in a certain behavior. The phenomenon is much more complex. A person may observe what another person does, interpret that behavior as acceptable, possible, or even desirable, and subsequently modify their own behavior. A process of normalization can also occur: what initially seemed strange begins to be perceived as commonplace when it is repeated within the group. For example, we may have an unhealthy relationship with a particular political party or religion that constantly commits all sorts of abuses; because these abuses are so common, society—or people within a certain sector—may come to view them as natural. If we add to that—as I mentioned earlier—media control or the use of people with a certain social standing, we have the perfect recipe for deceiving society, because social contagion is deceptive.

The other day, while listening to a talk show in Spain, I saw a Catalan journalist call a woman from Ceuta Garrula as she expressed her astonishment and blamed her nation’s government. Well, the hosts of the show, instead of sending him home—at least for a while—decided to reprimand him as if, deep down, he hadn’t actually done anything serious. That insult, in that context, disparaged the citizen from Ceuta in the presence of the gentleman journalist from a major pro-government newspaper. It demonstrated, on the one hand, “homophobia”; on the other, “sexism”; and on yet another, “classism.” The self versus others—and if those others aren’t on my level, “well, screw them.” Kudos to the journalist and, above all, kudos to the program’s management for not reprimanding that individual aligned with the powers that be as he deserved.

Peer pressure can play a particularly important role during adolescence. The desire to belong to a group, the search for identity, and the need for recognition mean that certain behavioral models have a special capacity to influence. The “id” prevails over the “ego.” And if the “id” is dictated by those in power, “it’s as bad as it gets.”

Social media has added a new dimension to the problem.

In the past, influence was limited primarily by physical proximity. Today, a person can spend hours observing the behaviors, opinions, and emotions of thousands of individuals they do not even know. The screen has turned social exposure into something potentially permanent.

Faced with this influence, the medical establishment is beginning to diagnose “screen addiction” among certain groups, classifying it as a disease so they can profit from it. The only thing that exists is social contagion. The influence of what we’re told on social media is exciting; it alienates and represses us or drives us, and this shapes our relationship with ourselves. If we’re not interested in war, we swipe past it; if we’re not interested in religion, we swipe past it; if we’re not interested in politics, we swipe past it, and so on. This undoubtedly leads us toward a constant danger.

One of the areas where the term “social contagion” has gained the most relevance is that of suicidal behavior.

For decades, researchers have studied the so-called Werther effect, a term used to describe the increase in certain suicidal behaviors following public exposure to a suicide, especially when media coverage presents certain elements that viewers can identify with or turns the event into a spectacle.

By this, I do not mean that such a phenomenon or case should be hidden. Most cases are rushed through on programs that mix celebrity gossip, murder stories, opinions on food, and so on, and are given only a few seconds of airtime; thus, nothing is clarified, and the idea is perpetuated that it is a topic that must be hidden—it becomes a source of shame, when it should be addressed in depth. On one occasion, I participated in a national television program as a field producer, where we addressed the topic of suicide in one of the episodes, bringing to light all kinds of possible causes. Only information can bring about a shift in social contagion. Poor communication, silence, or leaving the information to the whims of social media or AI creates more dangers than benefits.

A recently published systematic review analyzed 25 studies on social media and suicide. Its authors concluded that there is evidence consistent with both a possible Werther effect—of an imitative nature—and the so-called Papageno effect, whereby certain stories can have precisely the opposite effect and promote prevention.

The difference between these two concepts is fundamental. Information that portrays suicide as an inevitable, romantic, or heroic act can increase certain risks. Conversely, showing how a person overcomes a crisis, finds help, or manages to rebuild their life can have a protective effect. Psychiatrist and communication specialist Thomas Niederkrotenthaler of the Medical University of Vienna is one of the leading international researchers on the so-called Papageno effect. His research has examined how stories of hope, recovery, and seeking help can contribute to prevention. An experimental study published in 2025 found precisely such protective effects in social media posts focused on hope, recovery, and overcoming adversity.

THE GROUP CAN ALSO MODIFY BEHAVIOR.

Social contagion is not limited to suicide either. Scientific literature has studied mechanisms of social influence in phenomena as diverse as tobacco use, obesity, certain cooperative behaviors, and even emotional states. The work of Christakis and Fowler is one of the seminal studies in this field.

The explanation can be found in part in something seemingly simple: we constantly observe others to decide what is normal. What do they eat? How do they speak? What do they consider acceptable? How do they react to a situation? What do their friends do? What behaviors are approved of?

The answers to these questions can shape our own decisions. A sociologist might speak of social norms. A psychologist, of observational learning. A network researcher, of social transmission. These are different ways of approaching a phenomenon that shares a common element: we are not completely isolated individuals—hence social contagion.

Another area in which social contagion has been studied is non-suicidal self-injury, especially among adolescents and young adults. A literature review published by Stephanie Jarvi and other researchers examined precisely the social influence on self-injury and identified exposure to similar behaviors as one of the factors that may contribute to its onset and continuation. But once again, a fundamental caveat arises: exposure does not mean causation. Just because a person knows someone who self-harms does not mean they will do so. Individual, family, psychological, and social factors play a role in each case. That is why researchers prefer to speak of risk factors and social influence rather than automatic transmission.

Personal relationships.

The most recent research provides a better understanding of the extent to which personal relationships may play a role.

A meta-analysis published in 2026 in Comprehensive Psychiatry drew on 59 studies and more than one million people. The researchers found that exposure to suicidal thoughts or behaviors within social networks was associated with an increased likelihood of also experiencing suicidal thoughts or behaviors. By sociological extension, this finding can be applied to other topics.

The association was particularly strong when the exposure came from close friends or peers, whereas it did not appear to the same degree when it came simply from acquaintances. The finding is significant because it points to a specific idea: social proximity matters. We are not influenced equally by just anyone. The behavior of someone with whom we have a strong emotional bond can have a different impact than that of a stranger who appears on a screen for a few seconds.

At the same time, the authors point out a key limitation: much of the available research is observational. Therefore, the existence of an association alone does not establish that one person’s behavior caused another’s.

This phenomenon also places a responsibility on journalists and the media. The World Health Organization (for which this writer has little regard) has warned for years that certain ways of reporting on suicides can contribute to a contagion effect, while coverage handled appropriately can have a protective effect. It is not a matter of hiding the facts. It is a matter of deciding how to report them.

The difference may lie in avoiding glorification, not turning the subject into a mythical figure, not presenting suicide as an inevitable solution, and providing information on prevention and seeking help. The so-called Papageno effect demonstrates that the media need not merely amplify risk; they can also become a preventive tool.

An experimental study led by Benedikt Till and Thomas Niederkrotenthaler, among others, found that certain educational news articles on prevention were associated with a reduction in suicidal ideation and an increase in knowledge about prevention among participants.

The big question is what happens when traditional mechanisms of social influence shift to TikTok, Instagram, YouTube, X, or any other platform capable of reproducing content thousands or millions of times. A behavior that might once have taken weeks to become known within a community can now go viral in a matter of hours.

But there is also a paradox. The very same social media platforms capable of encouraging certain behaviors can also spread prevention messages, foster supportive communities, and facilitate access to professionals. Research on the Papageno effect on social media points precisely in that direction: stories of hope and recovery can reduce suicidal thoughts and increase the intention to seek help.

CONTAGION OR IMITATION? Scientific research itself has for years questioned exactly what “contagion” means. A systematic review of the concept found that the term is used to describe different mechanisms: transmission, imitation, contextual influence, or affiliation, among others.

Therefore, when a series of similar behaviors emerges, it’s important to ask several questions before speaking of contagion: Was there a common factor present beforehand? Did the people belong to the same group? Was there media exposure? Were there pre-existing vulnerabilities? Did the behavior actually spread, or did several cases simply coincide?

These are essential questions to ensure that a scientific hypothesis is not reduced to a simplistic explanation. Because the true significance of social contagion does not lie in asserting that “one person causes another to do the same”, but rather in understanding to what extent our decisions are shaped by our environment.

Contemporary research is painting an increasingly complex picture of the individual. We are autonomous, but not completely independent. We make personal decisions, but we make them influenced by what or whom (social media, religious, political, social, ethnic, or geographic groups, etc.).

Emotions, opinions, and certain behaviors can circulate among us. Some disappear quickly. Others take root. And some—especially when they affect vulnerable people—can become a public health issue. The great challenge for scientists, educators, and journalists is to distinguish between influence and determinism. Because talking about social contagion does not mean saying that people are puppets of their environment.

It means acknowledging something far more uncomfortable: others influence us far more than we’re usually willing to admit.

And in the age of social media, perhaps the question is no longer just who influences us. The question is how many people might be influencing us simultaneously, without us even being aware of it.

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Shlosberg Jailed as Yabloko Barred From Vote

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Twin court rulings remove Russia’s only registered anti-war party from September’s ballot and imprison one of its leading voices A Russian court has senten…

Twin court rulings remove Russia’s only registered anti-war party from September’s ballot and imprison one of its leading voices

A Russian court has sentenced opposition politician Lev Shlosberg to more than 11 years in prison, while the country’s Supreme Court has upheld the exclusion of his Yabloko party from September’s parliamentary election. Together, the rulings sharply reduce the remaining space for organised, peaceful opposition to the war in Ukraine and leave Russian voters without a registered party openly campaigning for a ceasefire.

An anti-war politician sent to a penal colony

The court in Pskov sentenced Shlosberg, 63, to 11 years and one month in a penal colony after convicting him of repeatedly “discrediting” the Russian armed forces and spreading what authorities classified as false information about the military.

The charges concerned his public opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. They included a debate in which he called for the war to end and a social media post featuring a foreign newspaper front page that attributed responsibility for Ukrainian civilian suffering to President Vladimir Putin.

Shlosberg, a deputy chairman of Yabloko and former member of the Pskov regional legislature, rejected the accusations. His lawyers argued that the conduct described by prosecutors did not constitute a recognisable crime and challenged the chronology, evidence and handling of the proceedings.

The defence also maintained that one disputed publication predated the criminal provision used against it. During the trial, Shlosberg and his lawyers raised objections concerning witnesses, expert evidence and procedural fairness, according to Yabloko’s account of the hearings.

Shlosberg had been in custody since December 2025. In his final statement, he said Russia had travelled from hopes for freedom towards the near destruction of civil and political rights. Yabloko said it would appeal the sentence.

Yabloko removed from the ballot

The prison term was handed down on the same day that Russia’s Supreme Court rejected Yabloko’s appeal against its exclusion from the State Duma election scheduled for 18-20 September.

The case seeking the party’s removal was brought by Rodina, a nationalist party supportive of the Kremlin. The allegations included campaign spending violations and copyright infringement. Yabloko denied the claims and argued that comparable questions over donations to other parties had not resulted in their removal.

The Supreme Court’s ruling means that Yabloko’s name and party list are to be removed from ballot papers. The party said it would seek a further review by the Supreme Court’s presidium and could also approach the Constitutional Court.

The two cases are legally separate. One concerns criminal accusations against an individual politician; the other concerns electoral rules applied to a political party. Their combined political effect, however, is difficult to separate: a senior anti-war voice has been imprisoned and the organisation through which that position could reach voters has been excluded from the national contest.

Criminal law and peaceful expression

Russia introduced broad restrictions on reporting and public statements about its armed forces shortly after launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The legislation provides for lengthy prison sentences when authorities determine that information about military conduct is false or that a statement has discredited the armed forces.

Russian officials present these measures as protection against misinformation during an armed conflict. Human rights organisations argue that vague definitions and severe penalties allow the state to treat peaceful criticism, independent reporting and calls for peace as criminal activity.

That concern extends beyond Shlosberg’s case. United Nations human rights experts previously warned that the “discrediting” provisions were designed to silence critical expression about the war and were further shrinking Russia’s civic space.

Amnesty International described Shlosberg’s prosecution and sentence as reprisals for exercising freedom of expression. The organisation called for his release, the cancellation of his conviction and the repeal of laws criminalising peaceful anti-war speech.

An election without an organised peace platform

Yabloko has not been a dominant force in recent Russian elections. It has nevertheless retained significance as the only officially registered party openly advocating an end to the invasion. Its exclusion therefore removes a distinct policy position from the ballot rather than merely reducing competition between parties offering similar programmes.

Supporters gathered outside the Supreme Court while the appeal was considered, and Russian media reported that several dozen people were detained. Yabloko chairman Nikolai Rybakov said the party would continue pursuing legal remedies and campaigning for peace and political freedom.

The rulings come one month before an election already taking place in an environment where independent media, civil society organisations and opposition figures face extensive legal and administrative pressure. Several prominent critics of the Kremlin are imprisoned, in exile or prohibited from standing.

As the sentence and ballot decision draw international scrutiny, the central question is not whether Yabloko could have won substantial parliamentary power. It is whether Russian citizens are being allowed a meaningful opportunity to support an alternative to the war through lawful political participation.

Imprisoning a politician for advocating peace and excluding his party from an election send a wider message to candidates, activists and ordinary voters. The immediate consequences fall on Shlosberg and Yabloko. The longer-term cost is borne by a political system in which the boundaries of permissible debate continue to narrow.

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A New Alarm at the UN on the Rudnev Case—and the “Arrigo Case”

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The case of Konstantin Rudnev has returned to Geneva, carried once more by NGOs that refuse to let the story fade into bureaucratic silence. Two NGOs in sp…

The case of Konstantin Rudnev has returned to Geneva, carried once more by NGOs that refuse to let the story fade into bureaucratic silence. Two NGOs in special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), CAP-LC and CADD, have filed a new written statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council, and its arrival adds another chapter to a saga that has already revealed more about Argentina’s judicial machinery than many official reports. The text warns that something in the system is shifting in ways that deserve attention.

The document begins by reminding readers that Rudnev is still recovering from surgery. It notes that medical prescriptions demand “continuous assistance” and that his condition remains fragile. It stresses that sending him back to prison would expose him to risks that authorities cannot ignore. These lines are stark. They describe a man whose health is central to the case. They also describe a moment when the judiciary should act with restraint.

Instead, the NGOs report that the Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation has decided to examine a prosecutorial complaint against the ruling that placed Rudnev under house arrest. The complaint was granted. According to the statement, this move does not align with the structure of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure. The CPPF assigns decisions taken during the preliminary investigation stage to judges with review functions. It “exclude[s] them from the jurisdiction of the Cassation Court.” The NGOs say this distribution of roles was designed to prevent procedural escalation and preserve the presumption of innocence; when cassation review enters a space the code reserves for other judges, the entire architecture is affected.

The appeal filed by Rudnev’s lawyer, as summarized in the statement, describes how the complaint was declared admissible despite lacking a legal basis. It argues that the intervention conflicts with Supreme Court jurisprudence on coercive measures and with international law. It adds that the ruling offers inadequate reasoning and fails to respect constitutional and conventional guarantees. The NGOs present this as a matter of legality, not opinion. They insist that procedural limits exist to protect defendants from unpredictable expansions of judicial power.

The NGOs also point to a pattern involving Prosecutor Fernando Arrigo. They write that he indicates to judges “how the Criminal Code should be read.” They add that he suggests how its limits may be set aside. The problem is not exclusive to Konstantin Rudnev’s case. Unfortunately, Prosecutor Arrigo treats other cases with the same disregard for defendants’ rights and a cavalier use of evidence. Clearly, in Argentina today, there is not only a Rudnev case. There is an Arrigo case, and it has now reached the United Nations.

The statement asks the Argentine authorities to take the situation seriously. It asks that the CPPF be applied according to its own terms. It asks that jurisdictional boundaries be respected. It asks that appeals not authorized by the code be avoided. It asks that decisions fully account for Rudnev’s medical condition. It asks that further injustice must be prevented.

The NGOs have placed before the Human Rights Council a description of a system in which review mechanisms may be expanding beyond their intended scope. They have also placed before the Council the image of an obsessive prosecutor and a defendant whose health cannot sustain another period of incarceration. These two elements form a picture that demands attention.

The European Times” has followed this story for months. The new statement confirms that the case is not only about one man’s fate. It is about how procedural safeguards operate under pressure, the relationship between domestic law and Argentina’s international commitments, and the institutions’ responsibility to act within the limits set by legislation. The filing in Geneva reminds us that these limits matter. It also reminds us that protecting human rights depends on consistent application of the law—and on keeping rogue prosecutors in check.

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Croatia Probes Coordinated Zadar Fires

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Four suspects detained after blazes were allegedly started across ten locations Croatian police have detained four people suspected of deliberately startin…

Four suspects detained after blazes were allegedly started across ten locations

Croatian police have detained four people suspected of deliberately starting fires at ten locations across Zadar County, in a case that has raised urgent questions about public safety while prosecutors consider the appropriate charges. Authorities say the fires were coordinated, but they have stressed that the final legal classification remains open.

Fires reported across Zadar County

The Zadar Police Administration said the suspects are three Croatian citizens, aged 46, 45 and 42, and a 33-year-old Polish citizen. Officers arrested them shortly after 20:00 on 15 August following a report that people were starting a fire beside a road in the wider Benkovac area.

According to the official police account, investigators suspect the four acted under a prior plan and mutual agreement on 14 and 15 August. Fires were allegedly started using an open flame or combustible material ignited with a lighter.

The affected locations include Zadar’s Bili Brig district and areas around Zemunik Donji, Galovac, Donje Biljane, Zapužane, Zemunik, Zagrad, Lišane Tinjske, Škabrnja and Benkovac.

Initial inspections found that a parked car was destroyed at Bili Brig. Forty-three olive trees were also lost in a grove between Škabrnja and Zemunik Donji. Firefighters extinguished the blazes with assistance from aerial units, while the full extent of the damage is still being assessed.

A civilian report triggered the arrests

The arrests underline the importance of early public reporting during periods of extreme fire risk. Police said a civilian alert allowed officers to identify a vehicle with Zadar registration plates and locate the four occupants quickly.

Investigators subsequently searched homes, other premises and vehicles under a court warrant. Police reported seizing a semi-automatic rifle and 44 rounds of ammunition from one suspect, and a pistol and several mobile devices from another. The discovery of weapons forms part of the continuing inquiry; it does not, by itself, establish the motive behind the fires.

All four suspects have been transferred to a police custody supervisor. A criminal complaint has been submitted to the municipal prosecutor’s office in Zadar.

Legal classification remains open

Croatia’s chief state prosecutor, Ivan Turudić, said investigators had not excluded terrorism as a possible classification but needed to establish motive and the full circumstances first. His comments, reported in Croatian media coverage of the investigation, stopped short of describing the suspects as terrorists.

That distinction is legally and journalistically important. Police have alleged coordinated conduct intended to endanger lives and valuable property, but no court has determined guilt. Whether the available evidence supports charges of causing a dangerous fire, terrorism or another offence will depend on proof of intent and motive.

Authorities are also investigating other recent fires in Croatia, including the destructive blaze near Omiš. Nothing in the Zadar police statement establishes that the four suspects detained in this case were connected to that separate fire. The incidents should not be merged without evidence.

Speculation risks inflaming old divisions

The case has prompted intense online discussion about the suspects’ backgrounds and possible political motives. The police statement identifies citizenship but does not attribute an ethnic, nationalist or geopolitical motive.

Unsupported claims risk turning a criminal investigation into a collective accusation against entire communities. Croatia and neighbouring Serbia continue to live with the social consequences of the wars of the 1990s, making precision especially important when identity enters public debate.

Accountability should remain individual and evidence-based. The suspects are entitled to due process, while residents, landowners and emergency workers are entitled to a thorough investigation into conduct that allegedly placed lives, homes and livelihoods at risk.

Fire damage reaches beyond burned land

The loss of olive trees illustrates the long aftermath of even relatively contained fires. Mature groves represent years of work, family income and local heritage. Destroyed vehicles, damaged land and the deployment of aircraft also impose costs that may continue long after the flames are extinguished.

The wider European wildfire season has already shown how repeated emergencies can stretch local crews and aerial resources. As earlier European Times reporting on wildfire preparedness noted, emergency capacity is increasingly being shared across borders while prevention systems struggle to keep pace with hotter and drier conditions.

Deliberately starting a fire under such conditions can transform a small ignition point into a threat to settlements, farms and emergency personnel within minutes. That makes rapid reporting, careful evidence collection and credible prosecution central to public safety.

The immediate investigation will determine what happened at the ten locations and whether further offences or participants were involved. Until that work is complete, the responsible course is to distinguish confirmed evidence from allegation, and individual responsibility from politically charged speculation.

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Qusra siege eases as UN reaches trapped families, but crisis deepens in Gaza

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Qusra siege eases as UN reaches trapped families, but crisis deepens in Gaza

UN teams on the ground reached the families after they were confined to their homes following the establishment of an Israeli settlement outpost nearby and the imposition of tighter access restrictions, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric told reporters at the daily noon briefing.

Some relief

A UNICEF team delivered water, food, medicines, hygiene items and recreational kits for children. As of Monday, however, the UN’s humanitarian office (OCHA) reported that three Palestinian families in the village remained surrounded by a heavy presence of Israeli forces and settlers.

Separately, municipal workers managed to repair water and electricity connections that had been damaged over the past week, though only after facing serious impediments – Israeli settlers attacked the workers, and Israeli forces detained some of them, Mr. Dujarric said. 

Israeli forces also reportedly ordered a nearby Palestinian factory to suspend operations, affecting local livelihoods.

Elsewhere in the West Bank, multiple people were injured over the weekend, including by live ammunition, in two separate incidents in Hebron governorate involving Israeli forces, settlers and Palestinians.

Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Ramiz Alakbarov, who is also the humanitarian coordinator, said recent developments in the West Bank underscore the urgent need to protect civilians, safeguard homes and property, and ensure access to essential services.

The update follows an appeal from the UN rights office (OHCHR) last Thursday, after three Palestinian families – around 15 people, including at least two children – were left confined to their homes “in a state of terror” in Qusra’s Ras al Ein area, with settlers accused of cutting off their power and water. 

The attacks are part of a pattern of escalating settler violence in Qusra since a nearby outpost was established in November 2025, OHCHR said.

Gaza: Strikes and shelter shortages

In Gaza, humanitarian partners remain concerned about the impact of continued Israeli strikes on civilians, Mr. Dujarric told correspondents in New York. 

Over the weekend, UN partners reported multiple air strikes and incidents of shelling, gunfire and naval fire, primarily west of the so-called Yellow Line, where most of Gaza’s 2.1 million people are now confined to an area covering less than half of the enclave’s former land mass. 

Civilians were reported among the casualties.

Humanitarian partners also warned that preparations for the coming rainy season are facing funding shortfalls and other constraints, even as the need for them becomes more urgent. 

Tents barred from entry

Ahead of winter, the UN and its partners have managed to purchase fewer than 30,000 tents – most of which remain stuck outside Gaza – against an estimated need of between 80,000 and 130,000, depending on whether more durable shelter materials are allowed in. Such materials still cannot be brought into the Gaza Strip.

Less than 40 per cent of the $4 billion required for humanitarian support across Gaza and the West Bank has been secured so far this year.

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US Courts to Publish Spyware Wiretap Numbers

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US Courts to Publish Spyware Wiretap Numbers


Counting Government Spyware for the First Time

The FBI has used hacking tools and spyware since at least 1998, and in all that time nobody outside the government has known how often. That gap is closing, at least for the narrow case where spyware is used to tap someone’s live communications. Starting with the 2028 Wiretap Report, the US judiciary will publish how many times judges authorised wiretaps carried out with hacking tools, a category federal agencies call network investigative techniques, or NITs.

Legal system – artistic impression. Image credit: Wesley Tingey via Unsplash, free license

Key Takeaways

  • The Administrative Office of the US Courts told Senator Ron Wyden this week that it will begin tracking a new “spyware/hacking” category in the 2028 report, which appears the following year.
  • The count covers only interception of live communications, including calls and messages on services such as Signal and WhatsApp. Remotely breaking into a phone to extract stored files, images or location history is legally a search and stays uncounted.
  • Privacy groups describe the change as overdue, and note that other countries already publish similar figures. Italy recorded spyware use against 4,321 targets in 2023.

What the Wiretap Report Already Covers

The Administrative Office coordinates operations across the federal judiciary and has issued annual Wiretap Reports for close to two decades. Each edition sets out how many wiretaps were authorised, split by federal or state judges, by state, by the crime under investigation and by other measures.

The reports also break intercepts down by type. Audio wiretaps capture live voice from phone calls. Oral taps rely on physical microphones and other eavesdropping methods. Electronic taps collect text messages, emails and other communications as they cross a provider’s network. The new category will add spyware to that structure.

Wiretaps carry a high evidentiary bar, because they are among the most invasive tools available to police. A judge has to be persuaded that a crime is under way before authorising one, which keeps the annual totals far below search warrant numbers. Scale is still possible. One wiretap years ago supported a surveillance operation that swept up millions of text messages across three months.

Why the Numbers Take Until 2029

An Administrative Office spokesperson explained the lag in an emailed statement. “The Wiretap Report is compiled from individual forms submitted from throughout the country and throughout the year. Before the new data can appear in the annual report, reporting forms and procedures need to be updated to accommodate the new categories,” the spokesperson said.

The full timeline runs long. The change was agreed in 2026, applies to data collected during 2028, and reaches the public in 2029.

A Decade-Long Request

Wyden has pressed for this since 2017, criticising what he called “the unnecessary secrecy around electronic surveillance orders.” He welcomed the decision while pointing past it.

“The American people remain largely in the dark about the different ways that the government is spying on them,” Wyden said in a statement. “I am thankful that the federal courts agreed to collect and publish data about hacking, but Congress must go further and pass my Government Surveillance Transparency Act,” referring to a draft bill he and others reintroduced earlier this year.

Privacy researchers put the value plainly. “Up until now, we have only been able to guess at the size of the problem,” said Eva Galperin, director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation and a specialist in government spyware. Once the figures are public, she said, denial becomes harder. “Being able to point to a report saying that spyware was used X number of times will help with accountability, especially if it turns out that number is quite high,” Galperin added. “It’s hard to say that you’re using spyware as a surgical tool when you’ve deployed it tens of thousands of times.”

Brett Max Kaufman, a senior counsel at the American Civil Liberties Union’s Center for Democracy, called the change “an important and long-overdue step forward for transparency around government hacking and should lead to better-informed policy and law around these issues going forward.”

What the Number Will and Will Not Show

The figure that lands in 2029 will be a floor rather than a total. It captures interception only. The far more common scenario, where investigators use a forensic tool to open a seized device and pull out what is stored inside, falls under search authority and still has no equivalent public tally. That distinction matters because the extraction category has been growing on its own, with purpose-built software for pulling data out of phones already in custody spreading through police forces well beyond the United States.

Context also comes from the existing reports. The most recent annual tally, covering intercepts concluded during 2025, recorded 1,735 authorised wiretaps, down 24 percent from 2,297 the year before, at an average cost of $92,963 each. A spyware line inside that structure will show what share of a shrinking practice now runs on hacking tools rather than provider cooperation.

The disclosure arrives while the market it measures keeps leaking. Exploit toolkits sold to government clients have turned up far from their intended buyers, including cases where the same iPhone exploit chain moved from a surveillance vendor to a suspected state espionage group to financial scam sites. Researchers have repeatedly traced commercial spyware vendors’ work resurfacing inside state hacking campaigns, and ordinary criminals now reach comparable data with malware dressed up as a routine phone update. Wyden made an earlier request for basic statistics on government hacking back in 2022 and got nowhere. Publishing a count will not settle whether these tools are used proportionately. It will simply make the argument possible.

Written by Vytautas Valinskas




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EU Bankruptcies Rise as Business Registrations Slip

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Second-quarter figures reveal mounting pressure on firms, alongside sharp differences between sectors Business bankruptcy declarations increased across the…

Second-quarter figures reveal mounting pressure on firms, alongside sharp differences between sectors

Business bankruptcy declarations increased across the European Union in the second quarter of 2026, while registrations of new legal entities edged lower. The figures point to a more difficult operating environment for many firms, but strong growth in information and communications registrations shows that the pressure is neither uniform nor evidence of an economy-wide retreat from entrepreneurship.

Seasonally adjusted bankruptcy declarations rose by 5.7% compared with the first quarter, according to figures published by Eurostat on Monday. Business registrations declined by 0.5% over the same period.

The divergence matters because it combines two different signals: more firms entering formal insolvency procedures and slightly fewer legal entities being registered. Neither measure captures the full health of Europe’s business economy, but together they suggest that accumulated financing, cost and profitability pressures are becoming harder for some companies to absorb.

A widening sector divide

Registrations fell in five of the eight sectors covered by Eurostat. Industry recorded the largest decline, at 3.6%, followed by accommodation and food services at 3.4% and education and social activities at 3.2%.

Information and communications moved decisively in the opposite direction. Registrations in the sector increased by 8.8%, while construction recorded a more modest rise of 1%. Financial-services registrations were unchanged.

The bankruptcy figures revealed a different pattern. Declarations increased in five sectors, led by a 21.1% rise in education and social activities. Transport recorded an 11.4% increase, while financial services were up 6.8%.

Bankruptcies declined in accommodation and food services, construction and trade. That contrast cautions against treating the EU-wide increase as a single, uniform crisis. Different sectors are confronting different combinations of demand, labour, energy, financing and investment pressures.

A warning, not a verdict

Eurostat’s definitions require care. A registration records the entry of a legal unit in an official register; it does not necessarily mean that a business has begun trading, hired workers or generated revenue. A bankruptcy declaration records the start of a court procedure, which may be provisional and does not always result in the immediate closure of the company.

National insolvency systems also differ. The figures are harmonised as index data to improve comparability, but they should not be read as a direct count of jobs lost or businesses permanently disappearing.

Even with those qualifications, the latest movement is consistent with other signs of corporate strain. In its second-quarter survey of euro-area enterprises, the European Central Bank found a further net tightening of bank-loan interest rates and other lending conditions. Firms reported stronger turnover overall but continued deterioration in profits.

These pressures tend to fall unevenly. Smaller firms generally have less cash, weaker bargaining power with suppliers and landlords, and fewer financing options than larger companies. A viable enterprise can therefore encounter serious difficulty when reduced margins coincide with stricter collateral requirements or a loan refinancing deadline.

The consequences reach beyond balance sheets

A bankruptcy is a legal and financial event, but its effects are social. Employees can lose wages or work, suppliers may be left with unpaid invoices, and communities can lose essential services. The particularly sharp increase in education and social activities deserves closer national examination because the category includes services that may be closely connected to children, families, older people and people requiring care.

Policy responses should therefore distinguish between businesses that are no longer viable and firms experiencing temporary but recoverable distress. Early restructuring advice, faster payment of commercial debts and access to proportionate financing can help prevent avoidable closures without preserving unsustainable companies indefinitely.

Recent initiatives have attempted to widen those financing channels. A European Investment Bank-backed agreement in Spain, for example, is intended to unlock €1.43 billion for small businesses and mid-sized companies, including targeted support for women entrepreneurs and green investment.

Such programmes cannot resolve weak demand or make every business sustainable. They can, however, reduce the risk that otherwise productive firms fail solely because affordable credit has become inaccessible.

The second-quarter figures do not establish that Europe is entering a generalised insolvency crisis. They do show that aggregate stability can conceal widening pressure beneath the surface. The next releases will indicate whether the increase was a temporary movement or part of a more persistent deterioration. In the meantime, sector-level scrutiny will be more useful than broad claims of either resilience or collapse.

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Spain Extends Almaraz to 2030

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The decision delays Spain’s nuclear phase-out and reopens questions over energy security, waste and transition planning Spain has authorised both reactors…

The decision delays Spain’s nuclear phase-out and reopens questions over energy security, waste and transition planning

Spain has authorised both reactors at the Almaraz nuclear power plant to operate until 8 June 2030, replacing closure dates previously set for 2027 and 2028. The plant-specific extension offers the electricity system more low-carbon generation during a period of international energy uncertainty, but it also exposes political divisions over nuclear safety, radioactive waste and the credibility of Spain’s transition timetable.

What the decision changes

The Ministry for the Ecological Transition has renewed the operating authorisation for the two Almaraz reactors in Cáceres until a common date in June 2030.

Under the previous authorisation, Unit I was due to stop operating on 1 November 2027 and Unit II on 31 October 2028. The extension therefore postpones the beginning of Spain’s planned sequence of nuclear closures by more than two years.

The plant’s owners, Iberdrola, Endesa and Naturgy, formally requested the change in October 2025. They argued that Almaraz remained technically capable of operating and continued to make a substantial contribution to the national electricity system.

According to the operator, the two reactors supplied around 7% of Spain’s annual electricity demand in 2025, equivalent to the consumption attributed to approximately four million households. That figure illustrates why the decision has consequences beyond Extremadura, even though the plant’s local economic importance remains particularly pronounced.

Energy security shifts the balance

The government has presented the extension as a limited response to changed energy conditions rather than a repudiation of renewable power. International fuel disruption, higher gas-market risks and uncertainty over the speed at which grids, storage and replacement generation can be deployed have altered the assumptions behind the earlier closure schedule.

Keeping Almaraz online provides continuous low-carbon electricity while Spain expands solar and wind generation. It may also reduce the amount of gas-fired power required when renewable production is low, although the effect on prices will depend on demand, interconnection capacity and wider wholesale-market conditions.

These pressures are not unique to Spain. As The European Times previously reported, energy insecurity has returned nuclear power to the centre of European arguments about industrial competitiveness, imported fossil fuels and strategic autonomy.

That debate cannot be reduced to a choice between nuclear and renewables. Europe’s electricity systems increasingly require several investments at once: renewable generation, stronger networks, storage, demand flexibility and sufficient dependable capacity for periods when weather-dependent output falls.

One plant, not yet a new national calendar

Madrid maintains that the Almaraz decision is exceptional and does not automatically revise the full schedule under which Spain’s remaining reactors are expected to close progressively by 2035.

That distinction matters. Extending one plant after a regulatory assessment is different from replacing the national phase-out strategy. Nevertheless, other operators, business organisations and regional authorities are likely to cite Almaraz when arguing for additional extensions at Ascó, Cofrentes, Vandellós II and Trillo.

The decision has also strained Spain’s coalition government. Sumar has rejected the extension as a departure from the coalition’s environmental commitments, while nuclear supporters contend that the government should go further and reconsider the entire timetable.

A transition plan can be changed when its underlying conditions change. But public trust requires the government to explain which measurable conditions justified the revision, why 2030 was selected and how future requests will be judged. Without clear criteria, an exceptional decision can gradually become policy through repetition rather than transparent debate.

Safety and waste remain central

The extension followed a favourable but conditional assessment by Spain’s Nuclear Safety Council. The regulator concluded that the installation could continue operating to the requested date subject to safety requirements and continuing oversight.

Regulatory approval does not end scrutiny. Almaraz began commercial operation in the early 1980s, making ageing management, maintenance investment, emergency preparedness and worker protection essential throughout the additional operating period.

Environmental organisation Adenex has announced that it intends to challenge the extension in court. Its objections include the effect on renewable deployment and the long-term burden created by spent nuclear fuel.

The government says the extension will not overwhelm Enresa, the public company responsible for radioactive-waste management and decommissioning. It argues that storage and dismantling plans can be adjusted to accommodate the revised date.

That assurance will require detailed, publicly accessible planning. Extending generation also produces additional spent fuel, while postponing one closure may cause more decommissioning projects to overlap later. Costs, storage capacity and responsibility for delays should remain visible to taxpayers and affected communities.

A longer transition for Almaraz

For communities around the plant, the extension protects employment and municipal income in the immediate future. It also gives authorities additional time to develop replacement industries, public services and renewable-energy projects before decommissioning begins.

That time should not be mistaken for a permanent solution. A credible just transition requires investment before major employers close, not emergency assistance after jobs disappear. The new 2030 date provides an opportunity to strengthen economic diversification in the Campo Arañuelo area, but only if national and regional authorities use it deliberately.

Spain has bought additional time for its electricity system and for one nuclear-dependent region. It has not resolved the larger argument about the place of nuclear power in the country’s low-carbon future. The durability of the decision will depend on rigorous safety oversight, transparent waste planning and evidence that the extra years are being used to build a more resilient energy system rather than merely postpone difficult choices.

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I visited Chairman Lee Man-hee in prison in Seoul

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I visited Chairman Lee Man-hee in prison in Seoul

A 95-year-old awaiting trial, a Korean August, and the standards Korea helped shape

HRWF report on visiting the 95-year-old Chairman Lee Man-hee of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus. He is in pre-trial detention…

Hans Noot (HRWF) visited 95-year-old Chairman Lee in Seoul Detention Center and testified at a press conference in Seoul on 7 August

HRWF report on visiting the 95-year-old Chairman Lee Man-hee of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus. He is in pre-trial detention during an extreme heatwave, and asks whether Korean law’s supervised alternatives should now be used.

Thursday, 6 August 2026 at 2:00 pm. The detention-centre visiting room is a little more than four metres square. In front of us, a wall of double glass perhaps ten centimetres thick. Behind it, an equally small room. Within it, a guard at a small desk, and an old man already seated. He had heard we were coming – three human rights experts from Europe. We spoke through a microphone; his voice came back through a speaker that crackled and kept fading. We leaned forward for the whole ten minutes.

Chairman Lee Man-hee is 95! He has been held in pre-trial detention since 24 June. 

I was joined by expert colleagues from CESNUR, Bitter Winter and CAP Liberté de Conscience. The rules were plain — no interviewing, no consulting, and no sending out messages he would give us. So we mostly listened to a man talking about his faith with an energy that clearly held him upright. Ten minutes through glass is not a medical examination. It is a witness statement, and I offer it as nothing more.

The question raised by this visit is therefore narrow but urgent: not whether Chairman Lee is guilty or innocent, but whether continued pre-trial detention of a 95-year-old defendant is necessary, proportionate, and safe when Korean law provides supervised alternatives.That question runs through the scenes that follow: the visit, the summers searing heat, the charges, the available safeguards in Korean law, and finally the request to the court.

The waiting room

Booking for an appointment at the detention center was simple, using the Ministry of Justice online service the day before and receiving an assigned time window. A passport is necessary to get in. Untried detainees may in principle be visited daily, a few people at a time. A visit may last only about ten minutes. We knew we were on the clock.

What no one usually describes is the waiting room outside the detention-centre visiting room. It is the room where families and visitors sit before being called in to meet an inmate for a few minutes through glass. Around us were men with tattoos and hard faces, elderly women holding plastic bags on their knees, and young women waiting alone. Nothing about the room was theatrical. It was ordinary, bureaucratic, and grey. Yet the weight of it was visible when some visitors came back out with tears in their eyes.

The heat

The physical conditions matter, because this was no ordinary summer day. It was 39 °C, the fifth-highest reading in Seoul’s history, and the city was under the first “severe heatwave warning” ever issued for the whole of the capital. Nor was it an isolated peak. Since Chairman Lee’s arrest on 24 June, Seoul has passed through the most oppressive summer it has ever recorded: twelve days at or above 33 °C and twenty nights on which the temperature never fell below 25 °C. Korean media have begun calling them “super tropical nights.” Throughout the day, our phones sounded with emergency public safety alerts telling citizens to remain indoors and drink plenty of fluids.

That matters more than a visitor might guess, because Korean holding cells are generally not air-conditioned. Rumor has it that once in a while some fans were turned on for short periods of time. 

Now put a nonagenarian into that arithmetic. Old bodies handle heat badly. They sweat less. They drink less. And they feel heat less accurately, so they overheat before they notice it. Prolonged heat then strains the kidneys and the heart, which is why heatwaves kill the very old first. What normally protects them is the cool of the night, and this month there was none. Shincheonji says Chairman Lee requires constant daily medical support. No independent medical assessment of him has been published — a gap any court would want closed before deciding anything.

The charges

The factual background is straightforward. Chairman Lee is accused of directing the enrolment of 56,472 followers into the People Power Party between 2021 and 2024. He ischarged under the Political Parties Act and with obstruction of business. The warrant of 24 June cited risk of destruction of evidence. A review of the detention’s legality was dismissed on 28 June. He was indicted on 29 June and again on 13 July; and trial opened on 24 July.

These are non-violent offences, and the contested question is not whether members joined a party — that is lawful — but whether they were compelled to. The church denies compulsion. There has been no conviction.

Scholars have expressed sharper concerns. In Rome on 3 July, Dr. Massimo Introvigne noted that EU states jail those over 80 only exceptionally and for violent crime: “Here, of course, there are no blood crimes, and the accusations are violations of electoral law“. He has since described the charges as “legally and conceptually overstretched“.

Separately, the day after the first indictment, the Minister of Justice publicly stated that “strict criminal punishment corresponding to its responsibility is inevitable,” placing the statement against a religious backdrop and quoting the Bible (Matthew 7:15). Whatever the prosecution’s merits, such statements make it harder for a Korean court to be seen to decide freely.

HRWF’s position is narrower. We take no view on whether the Political Parties Act was broken; that is for Korean judges applying Korean law, and their independence is something we defend rather than something we would influence. We ask one question, the one now before the court: whether continued detention, rather than a supervised alternative, is necessary.

The international standards

This is precisely what international prison standards are meant to test. Detention is not only a legal status; it is also a physical condition the State must be able to justify, supervise and keep safe.

The UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners — the Mandela Rules —are the agreed global benchmark. They require respect for each prisoner’s inherent dignity, healthy accommodation with adequate air, space, heating and ventilation, and health care comparable to that available in the community. They also require medical examination and continuing treatment, with particular attention to vulnerable prisoners, including the very old.

The Tokyo Rules point in the same direction: pre-trial detention is a last resort where other measures can secure the proceedings. That does not mean an old man may never be detained. It means detention must be necessary, and his health must be protected if it is.

The domestic legal question is therefore whether Korea must keep him in a cell to secure the proceedings, or whether its own safeguards can meet the same purpose with less risk.

Korean law already has alternatives

Detention after indictment runs two months, renewable only twice (Criminal Procedure Act, Art. 92). Article 95 requires bail unless one of five exceptions applies, the first being offences punishable by more than ten years; obstruction of business carries five years, Political Parties Act offences less. Article 101 permits suspension of detention under supervision or with restriction of dwelling — house arrest in all but name.

Korean courts have already reasoned this way in this man’s own case. On 12 November 2020, the Suwon District Court granted Chairman Lee, then 89, bail on electronic monitoring, residence restriction and a deposit. The court found that evidence-gathering had progressed far enough to reduce the risk of destruction of evidence, that the elderly defendant’s health had deteriorated in detention, and that he had attended trial faithfully, according to KyeonginIlbo.

Hak Ja Han Moon, 83, has had her detention suspended on medical grounds repeatedly through 2026, most recently to 2 September, returning to custody whenever a suspension lapsed. These are conditional, revocable measures, not impunity.

The car park

When we arrived at the prison grounds, we parked near two very different forms of presence. In one corner, supporters of the former President held in the same facility had set up with music from a loudspeaker.

Nearby, a tent had been set up with a dozen chairs, all turned toward the block where Chairman Lee is believed to be held. Inside, men and women sat, praying in silence, eyes closed, some with their faces covered by their hands. Even as we approached, they did not turn to greet us; their attention remained fixed on the building. They were followers of Chairman Lee.

What we ask

On 21 August a court is expected to take up whether Chairman Lee will continue to await in a cell the court decision about his pretrial detention or in alternative place where he can be cared for. The timing is not arbitrary: two months from his 29 June indictment falls at the end of August, the point at which the Criminal Procedure Act requires detention to be reconsidered rather than assumed.

We do not ask the court to acquit him, to hurry, or to treat a religious leader more gently than a company director. 

We ask three narrower things.

First, that the need for continued custody be assessed individually, based on independent medical evidence about his condition, not simply on the seriousness of the accusation.

Second, that the court publish the reasoning behind its decision for transparency’s sake, so that the public can see that it was based on judicial considerations, not political ones. 

Third, if custody is not strictly necessary, that the court use the alternatives provided by Korean law — as it did for this same defendant in 2020.

We ask this publicly, and we personally handed a written petition to the government day after our visit.

That is what the Mandela Rules ask of every state, and it is the standard by which every judiciary would wish to be measured.

A court that visibly applies it to the oldest man in its custody does not look weaker for it. It looks like a court.

The test is not whether Chairman Lee is popular, orthodox, or innocent. It is whether a democratic state can justify keeping a 95-year-old unconvicted defendant in a cell when its own law provides a safe, supervised alternative.

HRWF takes no position on the guilt or innocence of any defendant in this case, nor on the doctrines of Shincheonji.

The prayer tent set up in the parking lot, facing the prison where Chairman Lee is detained. Members of Shincheonji take turns there throughout the day to support their leader through prayer.

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How many cells are in the human body?

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For a long time, the number 37 trillion cells was cited as the generally accepted truth in popular science literature. This estimate dates back to a 2013 s…

For a long time, the number 37 trillion cells was cited as the generally accepted truth in popular science literature. This estimate dates back to a 2013 study in which scientists first attempted to count the cell types in the human body.

However, a large-scale study published in the journal PNAS has turned these ideas upside down. By analyzing data from more than 1,500 scientific publications, the researchers calculated the cell mass for people of different sexes, ages, and weights:

Adult man (70 kg): about 36 trillion cells;

Adult woman (60 kg): about 28 trillion cells;

10-year-old child (32 kg): about 17 trillion cells.

Which cells are the most numerous?

The human body contains over 200 major types of cells, which vary dramatically in size, shape, and function.

Red blood cells (erythrocytes): Transport oxygen and carbon dioxide. They make up the absolute majority of the total number of cells in our body.

Neurons: Transmit electrical and chemical signals, ensuring the functioning of the nervous system.

Muscle cells: Contract thanks to specialized proteins.

Beta cells in the pancreas: Produce the vital hormone insulin.

Platelets: Help blood clot, although formally they are not full-fledged cells, but fragments of larger bone marrow cells (megakaryocytes).

According to studies, blood cells are the absolute champion in reproduction – they make up nearly 90% of the daily cell renewal in the entire body.

Myth: “Every 7 years we get a completely new body”

The human body is not a static structure. Every day, nearly 330 billion cells die and are born in us. However, the rate of replacement depends entirely on the tissue:

The intestinal epithelium is renewed extremely quickly – the lining of the intestine is completely replaced every 5 days in order to withstand the aggressive environment of digestive enzymes.

Blood cells are also replaced at a rapid pace.

However, the brain and heart do not rejuvenate so easily. Many of the neurons in the brain accompany us throughout our lives, and the ability of the heart muscle to regenerate is very limited.

This is why the notion that every single atom and cell in us is replaced by a new one every seven years is a scientific myth.

What determines the number of cells in each person?

The final number varies for each individual and is influenced by height, weight, age and the ratio of muscle, fat and organs. A person who is 190 cm tall and weighs 90 kg logically has more cells than a person who is 160 cm tall and weighs 55 kg.

However, the relationship is not directly proportional, because the size of cells varies greatly. There is an interesting pattern in the human body: small cells (such as red blood cells) are present in astronomical quantities, while bulky and heavy cells are significantly fewer in number.

Bacteria in us: 10 times more or 1 to 1?

For a long time, it was believed that our microbiome contains 10 times more bacterial cells than our own human cells. However, more recent and precise calculations have refuted this exaggeration.

In 2016, scientists found that in a typical 70-kilogram person, there are about 38 trillion bacteria, and about 30–36 trillion human cells. This means that the ratio of human to bacterial cells in our body is actually practically 1:1.

Source: Rambler

The photo is illustrative: pexels-marek-piwnicki-3907296-11516492

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