At an HRC63 side event in Geneva, the Council of Europe commissioner linked pressure on journalists, protesters and civil society to weakening public safeguards ahead of Serbia’s election.

Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights Michael O’Flaherty told a Geneva side event on Thursday that Serbia had undergone a “sharp decline in respect for human rights” between his visits in April 2025 and May 2026. His central warning went beyond individual allegations: institutions intended to protect rights and uphold the rule of law were themselves losing trust, capacity or independence.

The discussion, “Fundamental Freedoms Under Pressure: Human Rights and Accountability in Serbia”, took place on 17 September in Room Concordia 4 at the Palais des Nations. Organised by the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights, it was held alongside the 63rd session of the UN Human Rights Council, which runs in Geneva from 7 September to 7 October.

Serbia was not the subject of a formal country debate on the Council’s agenda. The side event instead gave international officials and Serbian civil-society representatives a forum to compare concerns about freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, digital surveillance and accountability. A Serbian delegation was present in the room.

A warning about institutions, not only incidents

O’Flaherty’s presentation drew on two country visits made roughly a year apart. In his published remarks, he described a pattern involving harassment of journalists, limited accountability for alleged police attacks, strategic lawsuits against public participation, and a media market that he said favoured pro-government outlets.

He also raised attacks on peaceful protesters by police and unidentified people, allegations of spyware found on civil-society members’ phones, and the portrayal of rights groups as “traitors” or “foreign agents”. Such labels, he argued, do more than damage reputations: they can expose legitimate civic actors to violence.

One of his sharpest criticisms concerned the disputed events of 15 March 2025, when thousands of demonstrators in Belgrade reported a sudden disturbance during a silent protest. O’Flaherty criticised the Higher Public Prosecutor’s handling of allegations that a sonic device had been used, noting that around 3,000 testimonies had been submitted. He also expressed concern about warnings that people accused of spreading false claims could face prosecution.

The allegation remains contested. Serbian officials have said police acted within their legal authority when managing public gatherings, while prosecutors later dismissed the sonic-device claims. During O’Flaherty’s first visit, Interior Minister Ivica Dačić reaffirmed Serbia’s commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights, according to the government’s account of their April 2025 meeting.

Yet O’Flaherty’s argument in Geneva was that disputes over particular incidents cannot be separated from the credibility of the bodies asked to resolve them. He pointed to a broad loss of confidence in the police, concerns about the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office, deficiencies in the Protector of Citizens, and the apparent collapse of earlier cooperation between state institutions and human-rights organisations.

He also called for implementation of Venice Commission recommendations intended to protect prosecutorial autonomy. That concern places the side event within a wider European debate over whether Serbia’s formal legal commitments are matched by institutions able to apply them independently. As The European Times reported in August, rule-of-law and media-freedom questions remain central to the credibility and pace of Serbia’s EU accession process.

The election raises the stakes

The discussion came little more than five weeks before Serbia’s early parliamentary election on 25 October. In that setting, freedom of assembly, association and expression are not peripheral civil liberties. They shape whether candidates can campaign, journalists can report, monitors can observe and voters can make informed choices without intimidation.

Other panellists widened the evidence presented in the room. UN Special Rapporteur Gina Romero, joining remotely, said restrictions on civic space and alleged digital surveillance could undermine meaningful political participation. Representatives of Serbian rights groups described pressure on independent institutions, alleged spyware targeting activists, and rising threats and assaults against journalists.

Their interventions reinforced O’Flaherty’s institutional focus. A state may have an ombudsman, specialised prosecutorial procedures and formal channels for protecting journalists, but those mechanisms offer little security if investigations stall, official orders are not carried out or victims see no effective remedy.

In an election period, impunity can influence public behaviour before any case reaches a court: reporters may avoid an assignment, organisers may stay home and citizens may decide that participation carries too high a personal cost.

Hope rooted in Serbian society

O’Flaherty did not end with institutional failure. Asked whether he remained hopeful, he answered yes. His confidence, however, rested less on official assurances than on people continuing to exercise their rights under pressure.

He pointed to resilient civil-society organisations, academics who refused to be silenced, growing scrutiny by the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE and European Union, and above all Serbia’s young people. Students and other young citizens have been central to sustained protest and public demands for accountability since the Novi Sad railway-station canopy collapse in November 2024.

That closing note gave the Geneva event its most important tension. O’Flaherty portrayed Serbia’s human-rights safeguards as eroding, but Serbian civic life as far from extinguished.

The coming election will therefore be judged not only by the administration of polling day, but by whether journalists, students, monitors, opposition actors and civil-society groups can participate freely before, during and after the vote, and whether credible allegations of abuse receive independent investigation.

Secretary-General calls for international cooperation as the General Assembly confronts technological risk, climate pressure and unresolved conflicts

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has placed artificial intelligence, climate change, inequality and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine at the centre of his agenda for the General Assembly’s high-level week. His message to world leaders was direct: national policies alone cannot manage threats that increasingly cross borders, but international cooperation is being weakened precisely when it is most needed.

Speaking in New York six days before heads of state and government gather for the 81st session’s main diplomatic meetings, Guterres described the present moment as an “era of deep uncertainty”. He identified uncontrolled artificial intelligence, the climate crisis and deepening inequality as “three existential threats”.

The Secretary-General’s remarks ahead of the General Assembly linked these challenges through a common argument: institutions must be capable of setting shared rules without abandoning the principles of the UN Charter, international law and human rights.

Diplomacy under pressure

Guterres devoted part of his intervention to Gaza, the wider Middle East and Russia’s war against Ukraine. He called for renewed diplomacy, de-escalation and dialogue, while warning that civilians must not be made to bear the consequences of strategic rivalry.

In the Middle East, he said de-escalation must be “priority one, priority two and priority three”. He called on all parties to respect navigational rights in the Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab Straits and to avoid actions that harm civilians.

He also drew attention to Palestinian suffering in Gaza, renewed his support for a two-State solution and said the annexation of the occupied West Bank must stop. These demands place civilian protection and the prohibition of territorial acquisition by force at the centre of the UN position.

On Ukraine, Guterres said there was still no end in sight more than four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. He called for an immediate ceasefire as the first step towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

Both conflicts are expected to feature prominently during the forthcoming debates. The Assembly has already adopted an extensive programme covering international security, development, human rights and institutional reform, as detailed in The European Times’ report on the 81st session’s agenda.

The General Assembly can provide political legitimacy, public scrutiny and a forum for negotiation. It cannot, however, compel the major powers to compromise. Guterres’s appeal therefore exposes a familiar difficulty: the international system possesses agreed principles, but its ability to apply them depends heavily on the governments whose interests are often in conflict.

A warning against an AI race

Artificial intelligence occupied almost half of the Secretary-General’s remarks. He acknowledged its potential to improve healthcare, education and climate action, but argued that governments cannot ignore warnings that development is moving faster than society’s understanding of the risks.

National regulation remains essential because governments have the primary responsibility to protect their populations. Yet national rules alone may prove inadequate when developers, computing infrastructure, data and digital services operate across several jurisdictions.

Guterres warned that voluntary pauses by a small group of companies or countries would not be effective if their competitors continued developing increasingly powerful systems. With the United States and China central to the global technology race, fragmented safety measures could create incentives for weaker standards.

“The world cannot afford a race to the bottom on AI safety,” he said.

The Secretary-General pointed to the Independent International Scientific Panel on AI as one mechanism for improving the evidence available to governments. Scientific advice, however, is only one part of governance. Meaningful safeguards would also require transparency from developers, independent access for evaluators, accountability when systems cause harm and protection against discrimination, surveillance and the concentration of power.

Guterres’s emphasis on human dignity is particularly important. The risks surrounding AI are not confined to hypothetical future systems. Automated decision-making already affects access to employment, public services, credit, information and policing. Errors and biases can fall most heavily on groups that have the least power to challenge them.

Climate and inequality remain inseparable

The climate crisis formed the second part of Guterres’s existential-threat framework. Although international negotiations often treat climate policy, development and inequality as separate files, their consequences are closely connected.

Lower-income countries and vulnerable communities generally have fewer resources to protect homes, food systems and public services from drought, flooding and extreme heat. Many also face high debt costs that restrict investment in adaptation and cleaner infrastructure.

For European governments, the challenge extends beyond domestic emissions targets. Their decisions on climate finance, trade, energy and development assistance influence whether poorer countries can pursue a transition without deepening poverty or dependence.

The same principle applies within Europe. The costs of heating, cooling, transport and home renovation cannot be distributed without considering income and housing conditions. Climate measures that ignore inequality risk losing public trust, while delayed action leaves vulnerable households more exposed to rising physical and economic damage.

Reform without abandoning principles

Guterres acknowledged that the United Nations and other multilateral institutions require reform. Bodies created for a different distribution of global power often fail to represent contemporary political, demographic and economic realities.

His argument was not that reform should weaken existing obligations. Institutional change, he said, must strengthen the application of the UN Charter, international law, human rights and sustainable development.

This distinction will matter during the General Assembly high-level week. Governments frequently agree that the multilateral system needs to change, but differ sharply over representation, veto powers, financing and enforcement.

The credibility of the gathering will therefore depend on more than the number of speeches delivered in New York. On war, governments will be judged by whether they protect civilians and support diplomacy grounded in international law. On AI, the measure will be whether they can establish enforceable safeguards without allowing geopolitical competition to dictate the lowest standard. On climate and inequality, promises will need financing and implementation.

Guterres has defined the common thread: threats shared across borders require cooperation across borders. The question awaiting world leaders is whether they are prepared to accept the responsibilities that follow from that principle.

Measure heads to Trump with new pressure on Moscow’s energy trade and broad tariff powers

The US Congress has approved a sweeping sanctions package targeting Russia, its energy revenues and foreign networks supporting the war against Ukraine. The measure now awaits President Donald Trump’s signature, although its practical impact will depend heavily on how the White House uses new tariff and waiver powers.

WASHINGTON — The House of Representatives approved the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 on Wednesday evening, completing congressional consideration of a measure that had been delayed for more than a year.

The House agreed to the Senate-amended legislation by 262 votes to 159. It received support from 203 Republicans, 58 Democrats and one independent. Seven Republicans and 152 Democrats voted against it.

The Senate had passed the package by 86 votes to 11 in August. Trump is expected to sign the bill after his administration previously defended its tariff provisions as an important means of pressing Russia towards negotiations.

Sanctions reach beyond Russia

The legislation targets Russian political officials, oligarchs, financial institutions, state-controlled energy projects and companies connected to the country’s military-industrial base. It also reaches foreign actors accused of conducting significant transactions with sanctioned Russian institutions or helping Moscow evade restrictions.

Russia’s so-called shadow fleet is another focus. These tankers and associated companies move oil through opaque ownership, insurance and trading arrangements intended to reduce the effect of Western restrictions.

Under the published Senate-amended text, the president must increase duties on goods imported directly from Russia within 30 days of enactment. The rate can reach 500%, although the legislation does not require the maximum rate to be used.

A separate provision allows duties of up to 100% on goods from countries that remain among the five largest importers of Russian crude oil or natural gas. The same power applies to leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion.

The legislation does not name those countries in advance. Their identification will depend on trade data and determinations by the US administration, making implementation as important as the congressional vote itself.

Pressure comes with presidential discretion

The bill gives Trump a potentially powerful economic instrument, but it also leaves the president considerable discretion. Sanctions and tariffs can be waived following a written certification that doing so serves the US national interest.

That flexibility became the principal source of disagreement in the House. Supporters argued that secondary tariffs could force major purchasers to reconsider trade that helps finance Russia’s war. Democratic leaders and other critics said the measure grants the president excessive tariff authority while providing no guarantee that the strongest measures will be applied consistently.

The distinction matters for Ukraine. The bill can restrict Russian income and make sanctions evasion more expensive, but congressional passage does not automatically impose the highest available tariffs or determine how waivers will be handled.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had urged Washington to turn the proposal into law, arguing that Russia had adapted to earlier restrictions and that stronger measures were needed against its finances, missile production and energy economy.

Europe will watch the implementation

The American package could reinforce European efforts to limit Russian energy revenue, particularly if Washington and Brussels coordinate enforcement against shipping, financial and trading networks.

The European Union adopted its 21st sanctions package in July. Its measures build on previous action against oil intermediaries, the shadow fleet and actors connected to Russia’s military economy. As earlier European Times coverage reported, European enforcement also carries maritime, insurance and environmental consequences.

However, the US tariff powers could create friction if implementation affects allied countries or companies without close consultation. European governments will therefore be watching which states Washington identifies, what tariff rates it selects and how exceptions are applied.

The next decisive step belongs to Trump. His signature would give the administration a larger sanctions arsenal, but the strength and fairness of the policy will be measured by its use: whether it closes evasion routes, protects cooperation with allies and places meaningful pressure on those sustaining Russia’s war rather than simply creating another broad field of presidential discretion.

Brussels puts health preparedness, urban cooling and vulnerable communities at the centre of its response to extreme heat

The European Commission will develop a European Heatwave Plan after a summer of deadly temperatures, wildfires and water shortages exposed serious gaps in the continent’s preparedness. The proposal could strengthen early warnings, healthcare readiness and urban cooling, but Brussels has yet to explain how the measures will be funded, enforced or delivered before the next dangerous summer.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the initiative in her State of the European Union address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Wednesday.

She said the plan would address early-warning systems, health preparedness, urban adaptation and cooling, with particular attention to people most exposed to extreme temperatures.

The announcement marks an important shift in emphasis. European climate policy has traditionally concentrated on reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. That work remains essential, but the Heatwave Plan acknowledges that governments must also protect people from warming that is already affecting homes, hospitals, workplaces and public infrastructure.

A public-health emergency

Von der Leyen described 2026 as a “summer of truth” for Europe. She cited more than 35,000 additional deaths during heatwaves, alongside overheated hospitals and care homes, extensive wildfire damage and losses to agriculture.

The mortality figure is an estimate rather than a count of individually certified heat deaths. Excess-mortality calculations compare recorded deaths with the number expected under normal conditions, and results can vary according to the methodology and geographical coverage used. Even with that qualification, extreme heat is consistently identified as Europe’s deadliest weather-related hazard.

The danger is distributed unevenly. Older people, infants and those with cardiovascular or respiratory conditions face elevated medical risks. Outdoor workers, delivery riders and people employed in poorly ventilated factories may have little control over their exposure. Tenants in badly insulated housing can struggle to keep rooms safe at night, when the body needs an opportunity to recover.

Income also shapes the ability to adapt. Wealthier households can purchase efficient cooling, renovate their homes or leave overheated cities. Lower-income residents may face high electricity costs, insecure employment and limited access to green space or public cooling facilities.

A credible European plan will therefore need to treat cooling as a health and social-protection issue, not simply a matter of individual consumer choice.

From warnings to protection

Early warnings can reduce deaths when they reach people in time and are connected to practical assistance. Alerts should be available in accessible formats and multiple languages, while health and social services need reliable systems for contacting isolated residents.

Hospitals, schools and care facilities require heat-resilient buildings, backup electricity and clear operational plans. Workplace rules must allow employers and workers to adjust hours, provide water and rest, reduce physical exertion or suspend unsafe activity when necessary.

Cities can lower temperatures through shade, trees, restored waterways, reflective surfaces and publicly accessible cool rooms. Some of these measures are already being developed through European projects, including the urban interventions examined in earlier European Times coverage of climate-resilient cities.

Such projects remain fragmented, however. A pilot cooling shelter or green corridor may protect one neighbourhood, while residents elsewhere face unshaded streets, overheated apartments and health services operating under pressure.

The Heatwave Plan’s value will depend on whether it establishes clear responsibilities across the EU, national governments, regions and municipalities. It will also need measurable objectives. Authorities must be able to determine whether warnings arrived, cooling facilities were accessible and mortality declined, rather than reporting only how many strategies were adopted.

Local authorities face unequal capacity

Every European country has some form of national adaptation policy, but implementation and financing differ widely. The European Environment Agency’s assessment of climate resilience identified persistent weaknesses in risk analysis, monitoring, cross-border cooperation and the assignment of responsibility.

The agency also found that social vulnerability and fairness are not yet systematically incorporated into national adaptation planning. That omission matters because the people facing the greatest exposure often have the least political influence and the fewest resources to protect themselves.

Smaller municipalities face an additional disadvantage. Many lack specialist staff, reliable local climate data or the administrative capacity needed to obtain European funding. Without technical assistance and predictable finance, an EU-wide strategy could produce ambitious commitments in Brussels but uneven protection on the ground.

Insurance and firefighting join the agenda

Von der Leyen placed the Heatwave Plan within a broader climate-resilience package. She proposed a Climate Insurance Alliance, noting that private insurance covers only about a quarter of catastrophe losses in Europe. Governments and taxpayers consequently absorb much of the remaining cost.

The Commission will also propose a European Water Initiative and examine the creation of a future European firefighting fleet. These policies are connected: heat dries vegetation, increases water demand, threatens crops and places emergency services under simultaneous pressure across several countries.

Yet insurance cannot replace prevention, and firefighting aircraft cannot compensate for unsafe housing, degraded ecosystems or insufficient local preparedness. Public authorities will still need to invest before emergencies occur.

The Commission has announced the Heatwave Plan but has not yet presented its legal form, budget, timetable or allocation of responsibilities. Those details will decide whether Wednesday’s commitment becomes a durable layer of public protection or another framework that depends heavily on uneven national capacity.

Europe no longer lacks evidence that extreme heat is a recurring threat. Its next task is to ensure that safety does not depend on wealth, employment status, age or postcode.