Referendum campaign enters final fortnight with membership, sovereignty and democratic influence at stake

Icelanders will vote on 29 August on whether their government should resume European Union accession negotiations. The advisory referendum is not a decision to join the EU, but it could reopen a process suspended more than a decade ago and force a closer examination of how Iceland balances national autonomy with its extensive integration into Europe.

With two weeks remaining before polling day, that distinction is central. A vote in favour would permit negotiations over possible membership terms. Any eventual accession agreement would still require a separate political decision and public approval. A vote against would leave Iceland’s existing European relationships unchanged while delivering a strong political instruction against reopening the membership process.

The National Electoral Commission has confirmed that the referendum is advisory and that advance voting began on 27 July, including at Icelandic diplomatic missions abroad.

A European relationship already deeply developed

Iceland is outside the EU, but it is far from detached from it. Through the European Economic Area, Iceland participates in the single market alongside Norway and Liechtenstein. It applies legislation covering the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, as well as many rules on competition, employment, consumer protection and the environment.

The country is also associated with the Schengen area and cooperates with EU institutions on research, education, policing, asylum administration and climate policy. Icelandic students and researchers participate in programmes including Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

This extensive integration makes the referendum more complex than a simple choice between Europe and national independence. According to a detailed European Parliament briefing on EU-Iceland relations, the EU already accounts for more than half of Iceland’s trade in goods.

The institutional compromise is equally significant. Iceland can contribute expertise while legislation relevant to the EEA is being developed, but it does not have ministers in the Council of the EU, elected members in the European Parliament or a commissioner. It frequently adopts rules shaped through an EU political process in which Iceland has influence but no final vote.

Supporters of reopening negotiations see that democratic imbalance as a reason to reconsider membership. Opponents argue that the EEA arrangement provides valuable market access while keeping Iceland outside policy areas where national control matters most.

Fisheries remain the hardest question

Iceland applied for EU membership in 2009, following the collapse of its banking system and a severe economic crisis. Negotiations began in 2010 and advanced through much of the EU rulebook: 27 of 35 negotiating chapters were opened and 11 were provisionally closed.

The process stalled after the 2013 parliamentary election. In 2015, Iceland’s foreign minister told EU institutions that the country should no longer be treated as a candidate, although the original application was not formally withdrawn.

Several of the most politically sensitive chapters remained unresolved. Fisheries and agriculture, both largely outside the EEA Agreement, concern sectors closely connected to Icelandic livelihoods, regional communities and national identity.

EU membership would require negotiations over the Common Fisheries Policy, including conservation rules, market arrangements and the management of fishing opportunities. For an island economy whose marine resources have long been treated as a matter of sovereignty, the eventual terms would face exacting scrutiny.

Currency policy presents another dividing line. Advocates of closer integration point to the potential stability associated with the euro and fuller participation in European economic decisions. Critics warn that replacing the króna would remove an important national policy instrument. Resuming accession negotiations would not itself determine the currency question, but it would bring it back into formal consideration.

An Arctic decision with wider European meaning

The referendum also comes during a period of heightened attention to the Arctic. Questions surrounding Greenland, North Atlantic security, infrastructure and external economic pressure have made sovereignty in the region more politically immediate. The European Times has previously examined how tensions over Greenland sharpened European concerns about coercion and Arctic governance.

Iceland’s decision should not be reduced to security calculations. Its relationship with the EU is primarily a democratic, economic and constitutional question for Icelandic voters. Nevertheless, the regional context has changed since negotiations were suspended. Climate change, maritime transport, critical infrastructure and strategic competition are giving northern European cooperation greater weight.

For the EU, a renewed Icelandic candidacy would carry symbolic significance. Iceland already meets many European legal and democratic standards, making its potential path different from that of states undertaking extensive institutional reforms. Yet Brussels could not assume an easy process. Fisheries, agriculture and natural resources would still require politically credible agreements.

Clarity will matter after the vote

The referendum’s advisory status gives Iceland’s government legal flexibility, but it also creates a responsibility to explain what follows each outcome.

If voters support renewed talks, authorities will need to establish a transparent negotiating mandate and regularly disclose where Icelandic and EU positions diverge. Fishing communities, farmers, trade unions, businesses, environmental organisations and regions outside Reykjavik will require meaningful participation rather than consultation after key decisions have already been made.

If voters reject negotiations, the result should not be interpreted as a rejection of European cooperation generally. Iceland’s EEA and Schengen relationships would remain central to its economy and public life.

The most immediate democratic task is therefore precision. Icelanders are not being asked to approve a finished accession treaty on 29 August. They are deciding whether their country should return to the negotiating table, determine what membership would actually involve and preserve the final decision for a later stage.

That is a narrower question than membership, but not a minor one. It asks whether Iceland’s current position, closely integrated yet outside EU decision-making, remains sufficient for the political and economic pressures of the coming decades.

Courts, security concerns and climate pressure competed with a crowded cultural and sporting calendar from 10 to 15 August

Europe’s five-day news cycle brought consequential decisions on civil rights and state power, continuing insecurity linked to Russia’s war against Ukraine, and fresh evidence of modest economic growth. Extreme heat again disrupted daily life, while film festivals and continental championships offered a more celebratory, though still politically contested, picture of European public life.

Politics: rights and accountability

France ended the week with a landmark constitutional decision. On 14 August, the Constitutional Council upheld legislation establishing a right to assisted dying while clarifying safeguards for pharmacists, certain private institutions and adults under legal protection. The Council’s ruling settles the central constitutional dispute, but access to palliative care, regional inequalities and oversight will determine how the law works in practice.

In Britain, Nigel Farage returned to the House of Commons after winning the Clacton by-election. His victory also reactivated a parliamentary standards investigation into whether a £5 million gift was properly registered. The episode underlined the distinction between electoral endorsement and the separate duty of Parliament to enforce its transparency rules.

Germany’s cabinet, meanwhile, backed an intelligence-law overhaul that would give the BND and domestic intelligence service wider powers against hostile operations. Supporters presented the reform as an answer to espionage, sabotage and cyber threats. Press-freedom advocates warned that stronger surveillance and device-access powers must be matched by effective judicial remedies, source protection and independent oversight.

Poland also disclosed the detention of a suspect accused of preparing an assassination in Warsaw on instructions allegedly connected to Russian intelligence. The allegations have not been established in court, but they added to concern over covert operations and the protection of Ukrainian activists, exiles and other at-risk people on European territory.

War and Europe’s global responsibilities

Russia’s missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities kept civilian protection at the centre of the European security debate. Strikes reported during the week killed civilians and workers, while Kyiv continued to press its partners for air-defence equipment. Reports of alleged Russian-linked activity beyond Ukraine reinforced the view that the war’s consequences extend across European infrastructure and internal security.

The fifth anniversary of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan posed a different foreign-policy dilemma. Several European governments are expanding technical contacts with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities, particularly over deportations, despite maintaining formal non-recognition. Any engagement must contend with the Taliban’s systematic restrictions on women and girls, as well as Europe’s obligations against returning people to persecution or serious harm.

Economy: growth without comfort

The euro-area economy expanded by 0.4% in the second quarter, according to Eurostat’s updated estimate, while employment rose by 0.1%. The GDP and employment figures indicate greater resilience than at the start of the year, but hardly a broad acceleration. Energy costs, trade uncertainty and weak household confidence continue to weigh unevenly across member states.

New EU packaging requirements became generally applicable on 12 August, including conformity documentation, manufacturer identification and restrictions on certain PFAS chemicals in food-contact packaging. More ambitious recycling, reuse and waste-reduction targets will arrive later, leaving businesses and national authorities with a demanding implementation timetable.

Climate pressures also reached the energy system. Low Danube water levels threatened the operation of Romania’s Cernavodă nuclear plant and constrained hydropower and river transport elsewhere. The episode showed how drought increasingly affects electricity security, industrial logistics and cross-border coordination rather than agriculture alone.

Society: extreme heat becomes structural

Western Europe endured another severe heat peak on 13 August. Britain recorded its hottest day of 2026, while France registered provisional August temperature records in several locations. Wildfire danger, workplace exposure and risks to older people remained acute even as temperatures began easing in some western areas.

The repeated emergencies are turning adaptation into an immediate social-policy question. Cooling in hospitals, schools and care homes, enforceable protection for outdoor workers and access to shaded public space cannot be treated as optional amenities. Earlier European Times coverage of record heat highlighted the same gap between increasingly predictable danger and uneven local protection.

Culture: Europe’s summer stages

The Locarno Film Festival reached its final day after bringing independent cinema and international filmmakers to Switzerland, while the Salzburg Festival continued its combination of performance, public debate and European reflection. Across the continent, summer festivals remained important meeting places at a time when culture funding, artistic freedom and access are under pressure.

The week also demonstrated how climate disruption is changing cultural life. Outdoor screenings, concerts and historic venues increasingly require heat plans, later opening hours and stronger protection for staff and audiences. Cultural resilience now depends as much on practical adaptation and fair working conditions as on programming.

Sport: competition and contested neutrality

Three major continental competitions overlapped. Birmingham hosted the European Athletics Championships, Paris staged the concluding swimming programme of the European Aquatics Championships, and Zagreb opened the women’s artistic gymnastics Europeans.

The competitions produced elite performances and revived venues associated with recent international events. They also renewed debate over the participation of Russian and Belarusian athletes, including the use of neutral status and, in some disciplines, transitional arrangements for national symbols. Ukrainian athletes have argued that neutrality cannot be separated from the destruction of sporting facilities and the deaths of competitors during the war.

What to watch next week

Ukraine’s parliament is expected to return on 18 August, with senior government appointments and defence funding among the issues likely to command attention. European governments will also continue watching Russian attacks, air-defence requirements and diplomatic contacts for signs of either escalation or meaningful negotiation.

Zagreb will host the men’s European Artistic Gymnastics Championships from 19 to 23 August. Beyond the medals, participation rules and the treatment of national symbols will remain under scrutiny.

On 21 August, the European Commission is scheduled to publish its flash consumer-confidence estimate for the euro area and EU. The reading should indicate whether stronger second-quarter output is translating into greater household optimism.

The cultural calendar remains busy as Groningen’s Noorderzon festival begins on 20 August, combining theatre, dance, literature and installations. Weather services will simultaneously remain important sources of public information as heat and wildfire risks persist in parts of southern and central Europe.

The week’s developments point to a continent managing several time horizons at once: immediate security threats, long-term climate adaptation, institutional accountability and the slower work of sustaining shared cultural and civic life.

Five years after Kabul fell, deportation diplomacy collides with Europe’s human-rights commitments

Five years after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan, European governments are widening practical contacts with the country’s de facto authorities without offering formal recognition. The distinction remains legally and diplomatically important. Yet negotiations over deportations, consular services and migration are creating a relationship whose consequences extend well beyond technical administration.

The Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021 as the former Afghan government collapsed and international forces withdrew. Since then, women and girls have been progressively excluded from secondary and higher education, much of the workforce and large areas of public life. Independent journalism and civil society have also contracted under pressure from arrests, censorship and increasingly restrictive decrees.

Europe’s original response combined humanitarian assistance with diplomatic isolation and demands for inclusive government, human rights and safe access for aid agencies. That approach has not disappeared. However, migration politics and the practical difficulties of returning Afghan nationals have begun to pull European policy in another direction.

Technical talks acquire political weight

In June, European Commission officials and representatives of 15 EU member states met a Taliban delegation in Brussels to discuss deportations and consular cooperation. Officials described the encounter as technical and said it did not amount to recognition.

That distinction is genuine: governments routinely communicate with authorities they do not recognise, particularly over humanitarian access, security or the identification of nationals. Nevertheless, earlier European Times reporting on the Brussels talks documented concern among Afghan and European civil-society organisations that repeated administrative contact could produce normalisation without a corresponding improvement in rights.

Germany illustrates how rapidly a limited channel can become operational policy. Berlin has conducted several deportation flights to Afghanistan and has held direct discussions with representatives of the de facto authorities about flight capacity and landing arrangements.

A charter flight on 28 July carried 31 people from Germany to Afghanistan. Although the government said most had serious criminal convictions, one person had not been convicted of an offence. In its official briefing the following day, the Interior Ministry said the Länder could place people without criminal convictions on such flights, while maintaining that convicted offenders and people considered security threats remained the priority.

The case matters because it suggests that returns initially justified through exceptional public-safety arguments may gradually reach a broader group. It also raises questions about who monitors returnees after arrival, what assurances are obtained from the Taliban and whether those assurances can be independently verified.

Rights conditions remain severe

The expansion of contacts has not been matched by significant concessions from the Taliban on women’s rights. In a June briefing to the UN Security Council, the United Nations estimated that 3.8 million Afghan girls between seven and 18 were outside school, including more than 2.6 million adolescents. Approximately 250,000 additional girls are being permanently excluded from secondary education pathways each year.

The same United Nations assessment said 21.9 million people, around 45 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, require humanitarian assistance in 2026. Restrictions on female aid workers have made it harder to reach women and children, while the loss of prospective teachers and health professionals threatens services for an entire generation.

These conditions complicate any suggestion that Afghanistan has become an ordinary destination for enforced returns. The principle of non-refoulement prohibits states from sending a person to a place where they face a real risk of persecution, torture or other serious harm. That duty applies regardless of political pressure to increase deportations.

The Court of Justice of the European Union reinforced the protection standard in 2024. It found that the cumulative discriminatory measures imposed on Afghan women constitute persecution and ruled that national authorities may consider gender and nationality alone when assessing an Afghan woman’s claim for refugee status.

The judgment does not automatically prevent every return of an Afghan man. Authorities must still examine individual circumstances, including political activity, work for the former government, journalism, minority identity, links to international organisations or perceived opposition to Taliban rule. A credible return policy therefore depends on rigorous case-by-case assessment rather than broad assumptions that certain categories of people will be safe.

Engagement needs visible safeguards

Diplomatic isolation has not persuaded the Taliban to reverse its central policies, and refusing all contact would carry its own costs. Humanitarian agencies need access, families require consular services and European governments have legitimate responsibilities concerning people convicted of serious crimes.

The more important question is whether engagement remains governed by clear public conditions. European institutions and national governments should disclose the scope of technical agreements, preserve independent scrutiny of removal decisions and establish credible monitoring of what happens after a return. Engagement should also include Afghan women, rights defenders and diaspora organisations rather than treating them as observers of negotiations conducted about their country.

Europe must also prevent migration cooperation from becoming the dominant measure of its Afghanistan policy. Assistance for education, women-led organisations, independent media and human-rights documentation remains essential, particularly as humanitarian funding falls short of need.

Five years after the change of power in Kabul, the Taliban has gained diplomatic access without substantially changing the system it governs. European contact may be unavoidable, but administrative momentum must not be mistaken for evidence that Afghanistan is safer or more rights-respecting. The credibility of Europe’s approach will depend on whether every practical negotiation remains tied to protection, accountability and the voices of Afghans most affected by Taliban rule.

Clacton voters restore the Reform UK leader to Parliament as a £5 million gift probe reopens

Nigel Farage has returned to Britain’s House of Commons after comfortably winning the Clacton by-election, automatically reviving a parliamentary standards investigation into whether he should have registered a £5 million gift. His victory settles who represents the constituency, but it does not determine the separate question of whether parliamentary disclosure rules were followed.

The Reform UK leader received 22,239 votes, or 63.34% of ballots cast, in Thursday’s election. Count Binface, a satirical candidate, finished second with 9,455 votes and 26.93%. Turnout was 44.37%.

Farage secured 1,014 more votes than at the 2024 general election, when he first entered Parliament. His increased share also reflected an unusual contest in which Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats declined to field candidates, describing the election as an unnecessary political exercise.

The declared Clacton result nevertheless gives Farage an unambiguous mandate to represent the coastal Essex constituency again. The scale of his victory also demonstrates his continuing ability to mobilise a loyal local electorate despite sustained scrutiny of his financial affairs.

Why the investigation has restarted

Farage resigned his seat in July while the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards was investigating an alleged failure to register an interest under Rule 5 of the House of Commons Code of Conduct. The inquiry had opened on 13 May and was suspended when he ceased to be an MP.

That suspension did not close the case. Parliament’s published procedural protocol states that when a member leaves Parliament during an investigation, the commissioner suspends the process until that person is re-elected. Farage’s return therefore allows the inquiry to continue from where it stopped.

The case concerns £5 million received in 2024 from Christopher Harborne, a British cryptocurrency investor based in Thailand and a significant financial supporter of Reform UK. Farage has said that the money was a personal gift, provided before he became an MP and used principally to fund his security. He denies wrongdoing and has described the scrutiny as politically motivated.

The commissioner must determine whether the gift was sufficiently connected to Farage’s political activities to require registration. Commons rules require newly elected MPs to disclose registrable benefits received during the preceding 12 months. They are intended to show the public financial interests or material benefits that could reasonably be considered capable of influencing a member’s work.

No finding has been made against Farage. An investigation is not proof of a breach, and any conclusion must be based on the applicable rules, the circumstances in which the money was provided and evidence submitted by those involved.

A vote cannot settle a compliance question

Farage presented the by-election as an opportunity for Clacton voters to decide whether he remained fit to represent them. His victory provides a clear political answer within the constituency, especially after a campaign dominated by the allegations.

Parliamentary accountability, however, serves a different function. Voters choose representatives; the standards system examines whether representatives have complied with rules adopted by the House. Treating one process as a substitute for the other would allow electoral popularity to determine whether disclosure obligations apply.

The distinction also protects MPs facing accusations. An independent investigation offers a formal route to examine evidence and reach a documented conclusion, rather than leaving disputed allegations to be resolved through campaigning, media pressure or partisan claims.

The absence of the principal national parties limits what can be inferred about Farage’s wider electoral position. He defeated every candidate placed before Clacton voters, but he did not face the normal Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat organisations. Count Binface’s second-place finish underlines how heavily the campaign became a referendum on Farage himself rather than a conventional contest between competing programmes of government.

Consequences beyond Clacton

The outcome matters nationally because Reform UK has become a major force in British politics, with Farage seeking to displace the Conservatives as the principal party of the right. Questions about political finance, disclosure and external influence will therefore carry significance well beyond one parliamentary seat.

They also resonate across Europe, where anti-establishment parties frequently argue that institutional scrutiny is designed to suppress political challengers. Oversight bodies must remain demonstrably independent, consistent and transparent if they are to resist that framing and retain public confidence.

For European partners, Farage’s position is relevant to Britain’s future approach to migration, trade, security and relations with Brussels. Recent reporting by The European Times has shown that British public opinion on post-Brexit relations has become more open to practical cooperation with the European Union, while Reform continues to favour a more sovereigntist course.

The resumed inquiry should now proceed without assumptions about its outcome. Farage’s opponents should not treat an allegation as an established breach, while his supporters should not present an election victory as an exemption from parliamentary rules.

Clacton has returned its chosen representative to Westminster. The remaining question belongs to the standards process: whether a payment of exceptional size should have appeared in the public register, and whether the rules governing political transparency were properly observed.

Warsaw says the intended target was a US citizen of Ukrainian origin living on NATO territory

Polish security services have detained a suspect accused of preparing to assassinate a US citizen of Ukrainian origin in Warsaw on behalf of Russian intelligence. The operation, conducted with assistance from American services, raises renewed concern about alleged Russian covert activity against exiles and supporters of Ukraine across Europe. The accusation has not yet been proven in court, and officials have released few details about either the suspect or the intended victim.

Suspect placed in custody

Prime Minister Donald Tusk disclosed the case on Thursday, saying Polish authorities had prevented the planned killing before it could be carried out. The suspect was detained on 7 August and has been remanded in custody for three months while the investigation continues.

According to the Polish account of the operation, the target was a US citizen of Ukrainian origin whom Tusk described as “inconvenient for the Putin regime”. Tomasz Siemoniak, the minister responsible for coordinating Poland’s intelligence services, said American agencies assisted the investigation.

Officials have not identified the intended victim, explained why the person may have been targeted or disclosed the evidence supporting the alleged connection to Russian intelligence. They have also not publicly described the suspected method of attack.

The US State Department said it was aware of the Polish announcement but had no further information to provide. Russia’s Foreign Ministry had not issued an immediate response to the allegations.

An allegation with wider NATO significance

Tusk presented the case as the first known attempt commissioned from Russia to kill a US citizen on the territory of another NATO member. That assessment gives the investigation significance beyond an ordinary criminal case, but it does not by itself establish that the Russian state ordered the alleged plot.

Any attribution will require evidence capable of showing who recruited the suspect, what instructions were given and whether a chain of responsibility reaches a Russian state institution. Intelligence findings can help prevent violence, but criminal accountability ultimately depends on evidence examined through an independent judicial process.

The case also does not automatically amount to an armed attack under NATO’s collective-defence provisions. Covert operations are deliberately designed to remain below that threshold, leaving governments to respond through policing, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic measures, criminal prosecutions or sanctions.

Poland faces sustained security pressure

Poland has become one of Europe’s most important transit and political support centres for Ukraine. Its position has also made the country a prominent target for alleged espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks and influence operations linked by Polish authorities to Moscow.

The government has maintained elevated security measures across the country. Existing Polish alert levels include enhanced precautions for railway infrastructure and heightened readiness against conventional and cyber threats. Those measures predate the latest disclosure and should not be treated as evidence in this particular case.

Previous Polish investigations have alleged that Russian services recruited intermediaries to monitor transport routes, damage infrastructure and inflame tensions between Poles and Ukrainians. Authorities have repeatedly warned that recruits may be selected through online platforms and offered relatively small payments for individual assignments, allowing those directing an operation to remain at a distance.

Other European governments have reported suspected plots against Russian dissidents, Ukrainian officials and people connected to defence companies supplying Kyiv. The incidents differ in their evidence and legal status, making careful attribution essential. They nevertheless point to a broader security challenge that cannot be managed by any one national police or intelligence service.

Protecting people without weakening rights

The immediate priority is the safety of the intended target and anyone else who may be at risk. European states have a responsibility to protect exiles, defectors, journalists, activists and foreign nationals when credible threats emerge, regardless of their political profile or citizenship.

That protection should be accompanied by due process. The detained suspect is entitled to legal representation, judicial review and the presumption of innocence. Governments must also avoid allowing legitimate security concerns to fuel hostility towards Russian or Ukrainian communities, whose members cannot be held responsible for the alleged actions of intelligence services or individual recruits.

For the European Union, the case strengthens the argument for closer coordination among national security agencies, police, prosecutors and witness-protection authorities. It also adds a domestic-security dimension to the debate over how the bloc uses sanctions against Russia in response to the war, repression and alleged hostile activity abroad.

The investigation will now have to establish whether the Polish government’s public attribution can be supported in court. Until then, the most consequential facts are that a potentially lethal operation was interrupted, the alleged target is safe and important questions about responsibility remain open. Answering them transparently, without compromising the victim or the investigation, will be central to maintaining public trust.

By Professor Mikhail Nikolaevich Skaballanovich

In the Epistles of Ignatius the God-Bearer to Tralus, Smyr, and Polycarp, some passages can also be taken as fragments or echoes of the contemporary confession, and all of them speak only of Christ.

St. Ignatius’s expressions are remarkable: “baptized by John,”157 “persecuted under Pontius Pilate,”158 “put to death under Pontius Pilate and Herod the Tetrarch,”159 “crucified and died before the eyes of the Lord.”160 In Ignatius the God-Bearer, we also find the first expression of the symbolic formula of the Incarnation: “incarnate (in ancient symbolism—born) of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary.” This formula is used by Ignatius alongside the simpler one: “from the seed” or “from the line of David and the Holy Spirit.”161 Both formulas must have been used together until the first supplanted the second. In turn, alongside the expression “from the Holy Spirit,” Ignatius apparently uses simpler and more original ones: “from God” (“from Mary and from God”)162 “from the line of David according to the flesh, the Son of God according to the will and power of God.”163 Polycarp contains the following expressions: “who raised our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead and gave Him glory and a throne at His right hand, to whom all things in heaven and on earth are subject, who comes as judge of the living and the dead.”164 Comparing these passages with New Testament formulas, the mention of the Virgin (which, incidentally, is also found in Apostle Paul, Galatians 4:4: “born of a woman”) and of Christ’s death under Herod are particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, there is no reference to the resurrection (“He appeared to Cephas”) or to the ascension into heaven. It is also remarkable that there is no purely Johannine “only begotten” reference. Thus, the “confession” underwent few changes, if we are dealing with it—here and there (in the cited passages from the epistles of the apostles and apostolic leaders). Thus, the confession known to Paul, Peter, and John was accepted (as is evident from the writings of Ignatius the God-Bearer) also in Antioch and Asia Minor. It was, therefore, universal in nature, although there were local variations in individual words.

In Justin Martyr, we already find references to the trinitarian symbol. In those places of his writings that sound like a fragment of a symbol, expressions about God the Father are characteristic, as “the Creator of all this (Λημιοοργο᾿ ς τουδε τοδ πατο᾿ ς)”, “the Father of all”; about the Son of God, as “the Teacher who was among us” and for this purpose “born (or: carried in the womb) through (διά) the Virgin”, “crucified under Pontius Pilate”, “died”, “rose (ἀναστἀντα)”, “resurrected (άναγειρο᾿ μενος)”, “ascended (ἀναβα᾿ ντα) into heaven” and “reigned”, “Whom we place (ἕχοντες) on the right side “Who is to appear as the judge of absolutely all people”. The Spirit St. Justin calls “prophetic” and says that “we will indicate Him in third place, because we honor Him after the Word.”165 St. Justin does not yet mention the Church and the further members of the Creed. Moreover, in Justin Martyr we find the first testimony after the Gospel of Matthew about baptism in the name of the Trinity.166 If one cannot conclude from this, contrary to the commandment on baptism in Matthew 28:19, that previously baptism was performed only in the name of Christ, then the conclusion would be more likely that the confession at baptism now began to embrace the teaching about all the persons of the Holy Trinity. However fragmentary and incomplete such mentions and indications are, it seems likely that the confession presented to Justin in the expressions cited is far from identical with the ancient Roman one. Particularly significant is the absence, as we shall see: “Almighty,” “only begotten,” “but the holy church,” “remission of sins,” “resurrection of the flesh.” And from the fact that Justin became a Christian not in Rome, but in Ephesus, it becomes clear that in Ephesus, around 140, the baptismal confession was already threefold. – In the supposed fragments of the symbol in Aristides the Athenian, in his Apology, also written around 140, God is called “the Maker and Creator (κτίστης, δημορηὀς) of all things,” and speaks of “the Son of the Most High God, who descended from heaven in the Holy Spirit, took flesh, and clothed Himself with it from the Jewish Virgin.” Mention is made of the “judgment which through Jesus Christ is ready to come upon the whole human race.”167 The Holy Spirit is not mentioned, probably by chance. In similar passages of St. Irenaeus’s work “Against Heresies,” God is called “the Creator of heaven and earth and all that is in them, through Jesus Christ the Son of God”; concerning Jesus Christ, it is said, among other things, that “He will come with glory as the Savior of those being saved and the Judge of those being condemned.”168 Tertullian very freely, apparently, conveys the content of the “rule of faith” or “confession” of his time. In him, God is called “perfectly one (unus omnino), the only (unicus), omnipotent, the Creator (conditor) of the world from nothing through the Word (His), Who came into being (processerit)” or “sent out (emissum) by God, before all else, called the Son of God and under the name of God was seen in various ways by the patriarchs and heard by the prophets”, finally “sent from the Father to the Virgin” or “brought (delatum) by the power of the Father (virtute patris) from (ex) the Spirit B. into the Virgin Mary” and “became flesh in Her womb” and “was born man and God, the son of man and the Son of God”. Therefore, Christ, “ told the new covenant and the new promise of the kingdom of heaven, created the powers”… etc. – the usual symbolic expressions; “he sent the vicarious power (vicariam vim) of the Holy Spirit, the comforter, the sanctifier of faith (sanctificatorem fidei), who leads (aget) the faithful.” Christ “will come to judge the living and the dead” “through the resurrection also of the flesh, at the awakening of the part (i.e. people who had died by that time)”169. Thus, Tertullian first gives the embryo of the symbolic articles about the Church and the resurrection of the dead. The connection in which Tertullian’s confession places the doctrine of the Son of God with the doctrine of the Father and the Holy Spirit is also remarkable.

The designation of baptismal confession in the most ancient writers is also characteristic. St. Ignatius uses the term “confession” before the excerpts cited; St. Irenaeus, “ancient tradition,” “rule of truth”; Tertullian, “rule,” “rule of truth,” “confession of what we believe,” “by which we believe.” Tertullian says that those being baptized “answer somewhat more extensively than the Lord has determined in the Gospel.” Finally, in St. Cyprian, we find the very term “symbol,” as well as an indication of a very important feature in the form that the baptismal symbol had at that time. “If anyone,” writes St. Cyprian to Magnus, “objects that Novatian holds to the same law as the universal church, baptizes with the same symbol as we do, confesses the same God the Father, the same Christ the Son, the same Holy Spirit, and therefore can rightfully baptize, since, apparently, he does not differ in any way from us in the question of baptism, then let the objector know that, firstly, we do not have the same law of symbol with the schismatics, and the question is not the same; in fact, when they say: Do you believe in the remission of sins and eternal life through the holy church? then they deceive in the question, because they do not have a church.” A similar expression is found in the letter of Firmilian, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, to St. Cyprian: “Will Stephen and his adherents also accept this baptism, especially since, in its performance, both the symbol of the Trinity and the legalized questioning were observed in their own way?” “If anyone,” writes St. Cyprian to Magnus, “objects that Novatian adheres to the same law as the universal church, baptizes with the same symbol as we do, confesses the same God the Father, the same Christ the Son, the same Holy Spirit, and therefore can rightfully baptize, since, apparently, he does not differ in any way from us in the questioning of baptism, then let the objector know that, firstly, we do not have the same law of symbol with the schismatics, and the same questioning; in fact, when they say: do you believe in the remission of sins and eternal life through the holy church? then they deceive in the questioning, because they do not have a church? “If anyone,” writes St. Cyprian to Magnus, “objects that Novatian holds to the same law as the universal church, baptizes with the same symbol as we do, confesses the same God the Father, the same Christ the Son, the same Holy Spirit, and therefore can rightly baptize, since, apparently, he does not differ in any way from us in the questioning of baptism, then let the objector know that, firstly, we do not have the same law of the symbol with the schismatics, and the questioning is not the same; in fact, when they say: Do you believe in the remission of sins and eternal life through the holy church? then they deceive in the questioning, because they do not have a church.” Here the symbol, apparently, is not called the confession of faith, but perhaps threefold immersion, as the symbol of St. Trinity or burial with Christ, since in the fourth century, in the East, confessions of faith were not called symbols, but rather faith, dogmas, and so on. Baptismal confession is called here “questioning,” since it took the form of questions to the person being baptized, as we see more clearly in the Syriac Creed, transmitted to us by the monument “The Testament of Our Lord Jesus Christ.” But this passage seems to shed light on why the confession was subsequently given the name “symbol.” (The first time the name “symbol” was applied to baptismal confession was apparently by St. Ambrose in a letter to Pope Siricius.)

Thus, we see that by the third century, baptismal confession everywhere had not only the same content but also a nearly identical verbal expression, although, apparently, it was nowhere recorded, judging by the different variations among the same writer and by Irenaeus’s expression. about it, that “many barbarians accepted this faith without writing”171. This circumstance, strikingly testifying to the unity of faith of the universal church, subsequently, given the agreement of the then-current symbol with the fragmentary remnants of the Apostles’ Creed in the New Testament, could easily have given rise to both the belief in the apostolic origin of the symbol and the well-known tradition that the apostles forbade its writing.

The question of where the Christological symbol of the apostolic era was first replaced by the trinitarian symbol is hopeless. Traces of the latter are found simultaneously, as we have seen, in Asia Minor and Rome. Alternatively, Rome and Asia Minor can be considered; the latter, in addition to the aforementioned testimonies of Justin and Irenaeus, is also supported by 1) the presence of the concept of monogenes (John’s) in the Roman symbol; 2) the fact that Asia Minor was older in Christianity, the birthplace of Rome; 3J The fact that the trinitarian symbol soon became known throughout the East, which would have been impossible had it been of Roman origin, is evident. In the isolated Syrian church where the Didascalia arose, it was already considered a fact in the first decades of the third century that the apostles at the Council of Jerusalem had drawn up a threefold confession for the whole world. 172 Doesn’t the memory of such a confession originating in Jerusalem lie at the heart of this story as a historical kernel? The book of Elkesai requires baptism to be performed in the name of the great and supreme God and in the name of His Son, as witnesses to which must call upon heaven and earth and the “holy spirits.”173 This also indirectly speaks to the Judeo-Christian origin of the Trinitarian confession at baptism. Something similar could have happened with the symbol, as with the full-fledged episcopate: both moved from Jerusalem to Asia Minor, and from there to Rome; but in Rome they reached their full flowering.174

Notes:

157Ignatius the God-Bearer Smir. 1, 1.

158Trawl. 9, 1.

159Smir. 1:2

160 βλεποντων) of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth, who actually also rose from the dead (ηγε᾿ ρβη ἀπο νεκρων), just as the Father raised him up.”1

161 Ignatius the God-Bearer Eph. 18:2

162 Eph. 7:2

163 Smyr. 1:1

164 Polycarp, Philip. 2:1

165 Justin. Apol. 1:13, 31, 42, 46, 61, 65, 67. Col. with Trifol. 63:85, 132

166 Apol. 1, 61.

167Aristides, Apol. 2, 6, 8; 14, 2; 15, 2; 17, 8.

168Irenaeus, Against Heresies III, 4.

169Tertullian, De presser. 3. On the Veil of Virginity. 1. Archpriest Prax. 7.

170Tertullian. On the Soldier’s Crown 3.

171Irenaeus, Against Heresies III, 4.

172Didascalia. 24.

173Hippolytus. Refut. IX, 15.

174Secberq Lehrb. d. Dogmeng. 174.

Source in Russian: Skaballanovich M. The Preservation of Dogma in the Church // Works of the Kyiv Theological Academy. 1910. No. 9. P. 17-78.