This world-class supercomputer was unveiled in Linköping University during a ribbon-cutting ceremony. The event was attended by Anders Dam Jensen, EuroHPC JU Executive Director, and Lotta Edholm, Minister for Upper Secondary School, Higher Education and Research.

Anders Jensen, EuroHPC JU Executive Director stated:

“With the inauguration of Arrhenius, I am delighted to welcome a new mid-range supercomputer to our EuroHPC portfolio of HPC systems, marking another step towards enhanced European technological sovereignty. Arrhenius’ ability to carry out highly demanding computational tasks will allow our users to push boundaries in scientific and technological simulations, helping to drive breakthroughs in areas like drug discovery and climate change mitigation.”

About the Arrhenius Supercomputer

Arrhenius is a mid-range supercomputer capable of executing more than 60 petaflops, the equivalent of over 60 million billion operations per second. It ranked 42nd in the latest TOP500 list of the world’s most powerful supercomputers, published in June 2026. Designed to handle complex simulations and compute-intensive AI applications, it will enable simulations in areas such as climate modelling, materials science, life sciences, and engineering.

The machine will benefit a wide spectrum of users across Europe, including researchers, industries, and the public sector. Arrhenius’s strong security and data integrity criteria make it perfect for private companies’ proprietary product development and sensitive research involving personal data.

Arrhenius also combines high performance with energy efficiency. As part of the EuroHPC JU’s ongoing efforts to procure more energy-efficient supercomputers, the system delivers more than 61 billion operations per watt, placing it 24th in the latest Green500 list and highlighting its strong energy efficiency.

Through the EuroHPC AI for science access call, European users have already begun using Arrhenius ahead of its official inauguration, giving researchers early access to the new supercomputer. Arrhenius is now available to a wider range of users through the EuroHPC regular access call, as well as through the benchmark and development modes.

More details

The supercomputer was named after Carl Axel Arrhenius, a Swedish geologist and chemist who, in 1787, discovered the mineral gadolinite, which was later found to contain several unknown elements called rare earth elements.

The system was procured under a EuroHPC JU contract signed with HPE in July 2025.

The estimated total value for Arrhenius is EUR 68.5 million. It is co-funded up to 35% by the EuroHPC JU, with funding provided through the Digital Europe Programme (DEP) and contributions from the Swedish Research Council to NAISS.

The EuroHPC JU and NAISS, hosted by Linköping University,jointly manage access to compute resources on the new machine in proportion to their respective investments. To ensure an appropriate uptake by industry and public sector users, organisations like RISE, Research Institutes of Sweden, and ENCCS, the EuroCC National Competence Center Sweden, are also involved in the process.

Background

The EuroHPC JU is a legal and funding entity that brings together the European Union and participating countries to coordinate efforts and pool resources with the objective of making Europe a world leader in supercomputing.

To equip Europe with a cutting-edge supercomputing infrastructure, the EuroHPC JU has already procured 12 supercomputers, distributed across Europe.

European scientists and users from the public sector and industry can benefit from EuroHPC supercomputers via the EuroHPC Access Calls no matter where in Europe they are located, to advance science and support the development of a wide range of applications with industrial, scientific and societal relevance for Europe.

Currently, the EuroHPC JU is also overseeing the implementation of 19 AI Factories, across Europe, complemented by  13 AI Factory Antennas, which offer free, customised support to SMEs and startups. One of these is the Sweden AI Factory, formerly known as the Mimer AI Factory. The Sweden AI Factory will provide a mid-range AI-dedicated supercomputer that will prioritise cloud-style access mechanisms and large-scale storage for sensitive data. It will build AI support and training expertise in life sciences and healthcare, material sciences, autonomous systems and the gaming industry, all of which are areas of strength in Europe in general and Sweden in particular.

Additionally, the EuroHPC JU is deploying a European Quantum Computing infrastructure, integrating diverse European quantum computing technologies with existing supercomputers.

The EuroHPC JU also funds research and innovation projects to develop a full European supercomputing supply chain, from processors and software to applications to be run on these supercomputers and know-how to develop strong European HPC expertise.

With the recent adoption of Council Regulation (EU) 2026/150, the EuroHPC JU’s mandate has been expanded with new action pillars dedicated to the deployment of AI Gigafactories across Europe and the advancement of quantum technologies.

The investigation, led by the Spanish National Police (Policía Nacional) and supported by Europol, has resulted in the arrest of 21 suspects for offences including participation in a criminal organisation, drug trafficking and money laundering.

An action day carried out in Spain on 22 July 2026 resulted in the arrest of 15 suspects. Spanish authorities also issued 19 international arrest warrants against suspects located outside the country. Six of these warrants have since been executed, resulting in four arrests in the United Arab Emirates, one in Egypt and one in the Netherlands.

Among those arrested is a leading figure in a major underground banking network known as the “Dubai Bank”. Identified by Europol as a High Value Target, the suspect is believed to have played a key role in providing financial services for major drug trafficking operations worldwide.

Authorities have identified, seized or frozen assets worth approximately EUR 20 million. These include 48 properties valued at more than EUR 14 million, high-end vehicles worth over EUR 1.6 million and 121 bank accounts containing EUR 2.3 million.

Cocaine investigation leads to the money

Operation DRAKKAR grew out of an investigation into a major cocaine shipment intercepted by the Spanish National Police in February 2021. Officers boarded a vessel in waters off the Spanish coast and discovered 1 835 kilograms of cocaine. All nine crew members were arrested. After the crew and drugs had been removed, the vessel was towed to the port of Gijón, Spain. The ship subsequently sank after taking on water through a leak allegedly caused by its captain.

Investigators later discovered why: another 1 650 kilograms of cocaine had been concealed on board. Members of the criminal network are suspected of subsequently entering the sunken vessel and recovering the hidden shipment. It was established that both cocaine shipments had been loaded in South America in January 2021. The plan was to transfer the drugs at sea to high-speed boats, which would then bring the cocaine ashore in Spain.

The investigation into those behind the shipment gradually led investigators further up the criminal chain. Links were established to other suspected drug trafficking operations around the world, while following the financial trail exposed the individuals suspected of financing the shipments and laundering the proceeds.

This ultimately led investigators to a sophisticated international financial infrastructure used to provide underground banking services to organised crime.

The “Dubai Bank”

At the heart of the investigation was a clandestine money-transfer network referred to as the “Dubai Bank”. The network is suspected of making large amounts of money available to criminal organisations in different countries within very short periods of time, providing the financial infrastructure needed to fund major drug shipments and move the resulting criminal proceeds.

Rather than physically transferring money across borders for every transaction, underground banking networks can move value between jurisdictions through networks of brokers. Payments can be settled through internal accounting and compensation mechanisms, including trade transactions, companies and their bank accounts, cash pooling or transfers of other assets.

The network operated on a commission basis, with fees varying depending on the transaction and other factors.

Investigators also identified the use of tokens to authenticate cash transactions. A unique identifier, frequently the serial number of a banknote, could be passed through the transfer chain. Presenting the matching identifier when collecting the cash allowed those involved to verify that the money was being handed to the intended recipient.

The financial investigation also identified assets suspected of having been acquired using illicit funds, including a luxury property in Ibiza.

Europol support

Europol has supported the investigation by facilitating international information exchange and providing operational and financial analysis that helped identify key money brokers within the network. Since October 2024, the investigation has also been supported through an Operational Taskforce set up at Europol.

Europol provided specialised expertise on underground banking, and asset tracing and recovery. Specialists were deployed to Spain for the action day, where a money laundering specialist supported investigators on the ground with a mobile office.

Given the global reach of the network, international cooperation was central to the investigation. Authorities from the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States, including the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), contributed to the investigation.

Empact

The European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) tackles the most important threats posed by organised and serious international crime affecting the EU. EMPACT strengthens intelligence, strategic and operational cooperation between national authorities, EU institutions and bodies, and international partners. EMPACT runs in four-year cycles focusing on common EU crime priorities.

EU officials warn that a decentralised digital ecosystem is turning coercion and spectacle into real-world harm

European security officials are warning that loosely connected online networks are drawing children into communities where violence, abuse and notoriety become forms of social currency. The emerging threat does not fit conventional categories of political or religious extremism, complicating efforts to identify vulnerable young people before digital coercion produces offline harm.

The warning centres on “The Com”, an umbrella term used for a fragmented ecosystem operating across social media, messaging services, gaming environments and other digital platforms. Its participants may glorify violence without sharing a coherent political ideology, while some groups manipulate minors into committing or recording abuse.

Investigators from nine European countries identified about 4,340 web addresses connected to the ecosystem during a disruption campaign in June and July, according to a warning issued on Tuesday by EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Bartjan Wegter. He described the phenomenon as violence pursued for its own sake rather than as a means of advancing a recognisable ideological programme.

A threat without a settled definition

“Nihilistic violent extremism” is an emerging law-enforcement category, not a consistently defined criminal offence across Europe. Conduct associated with these networks can be investigated as terrorism, child sexual exploitation, assault, incitement, coercion or other ordinary criminality, depending on the case and national law.

That uncertainty matters. It means Europe does not have a reliable single figure for the number of people involved, while changes in terminology can make the phenomenon appear either larger or smaller than it is. Thousands of identified web addresses do not necessarily represent thousands of separate offenders, organisations or planned attacks.

The wider security picture nevertheless shows why authorities are concerned about youth involvement. Europol’s 2026 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report recorded 45 completed, failed or foiled terrorist attacks in ten EU countries during 2025. Six people were killed, while 486 suspects were arrested across 21 member states. Around one-third of those arrested were minors, most of them boys.

Those terrorism statistics should not be treated as a direct count of participants in The Com. They instead reveal a broader environment in which young people occupy an increasingly prominent place in extremist investigations, whether through ideological radicalisation, hybrid online subcultures or networks driven principally by cruelty, status and spectacle.

Children as victims and alleged offenders

The distinction between victim and perpetrator is especially difficult when minors are involved. A child may enter a group seeking friendship or recognition, become exposed to escalating violent material, and then face pressure to produce abusive content or carry out harmful acts. Threats, blackmail and the circulation of intimate images can make leaving the community dangerous.

Some young participants may commit serious offences and present an immediate risk to others. That does not remove the need to examine how they were recruited, coerced or exploited. A response based exclusively on arrest can miss earlier opportunities for intervention by schools, families, youth services and mental-health professionals.

It can also discourage children from reporting abuse if they believe disclosure will lead only to punishment. Effective safeguarding requires confidential reporting channels, properly trained investigators and support that recognises both the harm suffered and the harm a young person may have caused.

The networks’ decentralised structure makes prevention harder. There may be no clear leader, membership list or single platform to remove. Communities can migrate between public channels, encrypted groups, gaming services and temporary accounts, while violent material is copied and redistributed faster than individual moderators can assess it.

Platform responsibility and privacy

Wegter said that 85% of investigations now involve the digital environment and argued that law-enforcement capabilities must reflect that reality. Yet broader surveillance is not automatically an effective or proportionate answer.

Encrypted communication protects journalists, activists, abuse survivors and ordinary citizens as well as concealing criminal activity. Measures that weaken security for every user could create new risks without reliably exposing small networks that continually change their language, accounts and services.

The more sustainable question is whether platforms are identifying coercive behaviour, escalation patterns and networks of repeat offenders quickly enough. As The European Times previously reported, Europe’s child-safety debate is increasingly focused on the design and incentives of digital services, not only on individual pieces of harmful content.

That approach places responsibility on companies to assess systemic risks, preserve evidence lawfully, provide accessible reporting tools and cooperate across borders. It also requires independent scrutiny so that automated detection systems do not wrongly classify legitimate speech, disproportionately target minority communities or subject children to intrusive identity checks.

Prevention must begin before violence

The emerging threat presents Europe with a narrow but important policy choice. Authorities must be able to intervene when there is credible evidence of coercion or impending violence, but an expansive new extremism label should not become a substitute for precise criminal investigation.

Schools and youth services need guidance that distinguishes ordinary adolescent interest in disturbing material from signs of manipulation, fixation or preparation for harm. Families need reporting routes that do not require them to understand a constantly changing vocabulary of platforms and subcultures. Children themselves should be included in prevention work because they often recognise shifts in online behaviour before adults do.

The immediate danger is real, but so is the risk of responding with a security framework too broad to be accountable. Europe’s strongest response will combine targeted investigations with child protection, digital literacy, mental-health support and enforceable duties for platforms. Young people drawn into these networks must be held responsible where the evidence requires it, while still being recognised as children whose vulnerability may have been deliberately exploited.

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New price data complicate the interest-rate debate days before Sweden’s general election

Sweden’s central measure of inflation remained far below the central bank’s target in August, according to preliminary figures released on Monday, sharpening questions over interest rates and household finances less than a week before the country votes.

The annual inflation rate measured by CPIF, which holds mortgage interest rates constant and guides the Riksbank’s monetary policy, was unchanged at 0.7% in August. Prices on this measure fell by 0.3% from July.

Headline consumer price inflation edged up from 0.2% to 0.3% annually, while CPIF excluding energy weakened from 0.6% to 0.5%. The figures were published in Statistics Sweden’s August flash estimate.

Pressure shifts towards the Riksbank

The reading complicates the outlook for Sweden’s central bank. The Riksbank left its policy rate unchanged at 1.75% in August but said the possibility of an increase later in 2026 remained on the table. It was concerned that supply disruptions and stronger price pressures during the summer could produce a more persistent rise in underlying inflation.

Monday’s data do not confirm that scenario. The stability of CPIF and the decline in the measure excluding energy instead suggest that underlying price growth remained subdued in August. That may reduce the immediate case for tighter monetary policy, although one monthly estimate is unlikely to settle the debate.

The Riksbank’s next monetary-policy decision is due on 24 September. By then, policymakers will have the definitive August inflation figures and additional evidence on employment, consumption and business conditions.

The bank’s dilemma extends beyond the headline rate. Economic sentiment has improved, but unemployment remains high. Raising borrowing costs could restrain any emerging price pressure, while also making mortgages and business investment more expensive during an incomplete recovery.

Lower inflation is not lower prices

For households, an inflation rate of 0.7% does not mean that the cost-of-living increases of recent years have been reversed. It means that the overall price level is rising more slowly than it was a year earlier. Families still make spending decisions from a higher base, and the burden remains uneven across income groups and regions.

The preliminary release also contains less detail than Statistics Sweden’s full monthly report. It establishes the direction of the main indices but cannot yet show comprehensively which goods and services drove the change. The definitive figures, including fuller category data, will be published on 14 September.

That timing is politically significant. Sweden will elect its national, regional and municipal representatives on 13 September, meaning voters will go to the polls with only the flash estimate available. Questions of purchasing power, taxation, employment and public services are therefore being debated before the complete August price picture is known.

The contrast with parts of the euro area is also striking. While Sweden is experiencing subdued measured inflation, other European economies have continued to confront energy-driven price pressure and difficult choices over targeted household support. The European Times has previously examined how energy costs can transmit through household bills and business expenses.

A cautious signal, not a settled outlook

Monday’s estimate gives the Riksbank more reason to wait, but not enough evidence to declare the inflation risk over. International energy markets, supply conditions, wage growth and the strength of domestic demand could still alter the outlook during the autumn.

The clearest conclusion is narrower: Sweden entered the final days of its election campaign with inflation still exceptionally subdued by its central measure. Whether that becomes lasting relief for households, room for lower borrowing costs or merely a temporary pause will depend on evidence arriving after the votes are counted.

The Chancery Lane Project’s climate clauses become part of the UK Government’s standard services contract

London, 7 September 2026: UK-based legal nonprofit, The Chancery Lane Project (TCLP), has reached a significant milestone in the mainstream adoption of climate-aligned contracting. Clauses developed by its global community of legal volunteers now form part of the UK Government’s Model Services Contract (MSC).

The Model Services Contract is the Government’s standard form agreement for many of its highest-value and most complex services contracts, typically those worth £20 million or more. Its optional Schedule 28 on carbon reduction incorporates two mechanisms adapted from TCLP model clauses: a gain-share mechanism based on Jess & Rory’s Clause, and a net zero contract modification procedure adapted from Luna’s Clause.

The inclusion marks the culmination of a multi-year journey in which TCLP’s model clauses moved from an open-access clause library, into UK procurement policy, and now into the Government’s own standard contractual framework. 

The gain-share mechanism rewards suppliers that reduce emissions beyond agreed contractual targets by allowing contracting authorities to share the value created by additional carbon savings. The net zero modification procedure enables either party to propose changes during the life of a contract where lower-carbon methods become available, helping ensure decarbonisation remains part of contract management rather than a one-off procurement exercise. Together, these mechanisms support a wider approach to climate contracting that includes measuring emissions, monitoring progress, encouraging continuous improvement and cascading climate obligations through supply chains. 

The clauses’ inclusion in the Model Services Contract follows the Government’s earlier adoption through Procurement Policy Note 01/24, which introduced a contract-specific carbon reduction schedule for in-scope government services contracts. That policy was subsequently updated to align with the Procurement Act 2023 as Procurement Policy Note 016 before being incorporated into the Model Services Contract’s optional Schedule 28. 

Recent updates to the Government’s Social Value Model further reinforce the importance of contractual mechanisms for delivering environmental outcomes. With environmental and net zero outcomes no longer a core part of the Social Value Model itself, environmental sustainability matters like carbon reduction, responsible sourcing and climate resilience will continue to be addressed through mechanisms like procurement policy notes PPN 016 (Carbon Reduction Schedule), PPN 006 (Carbon Reduction Plans), commercial and technical requirements, award criteria and contract management.

While Schedule 28 is optional and contracting authorities decide when it is appropriate to use, its inclusion in the Government’s standard form contract represents an important step in embedding climate considerations into the contracts governing public procurement. Rather than requiring authorities to develop bespoke provisions, the mechanisms are now drafted, reviewed and available within the standard contractual framework used across government. 

Ben Metz, Executive Director of The Chancery Lane Project, said: “This is exactly what The Chancery Lane Project was created to achieve. We work with our global community of volunteer lawyers to develop practical legal solutions that can be adopted at scale. Seeing mechanisms adapted from our model clauses incorporated into the Government’s standard services contract means contracting authorities have practical, ready-made ways to reduce emissions through the contracts they already use. 

“As climate considerations become increasingly embedded through contractual requirements, standard contract provisions such as Schedule 28 will become an increasingly important way of delivering carbon reduction across public procurement.”

Public procurement represents one of the UK’s most significant opportunities to drive emissions reduction. By embedding practical climate mechanisms into standard contracts, legal drafting has the potential to influence not only government suppliers but also the wider supply chains that support public service delivery.

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Member-state objections halt Kaja Kallas’s expert initiative before its planned launch

The planned launch of a high-level group on European defence has been cancelled after several EU governments objected to how the initiative was organised. The setback does not reverse Europe’s wider defence programme, but it exposes unresolved tensions over who sets priorities, how capitals are consulted and where institutional authority lies.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas had been due to present the advisory group in Brussels on Monday morning. However, reporting from Brussels indicated that France, Germany and Italy were among the governments that opposed proceeding with the initiative in its proposed form.

An EU official said discussions with defence ministers had led to a decision not to pursue that particular approach. Officials were examining other ways to involve member states, suggesting that the search for outside recommendations may continue under a different structure.

The cancellation was reported shortly before the scheduled launch. As of Monday morning, the European Commission’s public calendar still displayed the event, illustrating how rapidly the decision was taken and leaving the institutions with a public-information gap to correct.

From announcement to cancellation

Kallas announced the proposed group on 1 September after an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Ireland. According to her official remarks in Wicklow, it was intended to bring together senior political and military figures from EU countries, the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

The participants were expected to consider how Europe could close identified gaps in conventional military capability more quickly and effectively. Their conclusions would have been assembled into a report containing recommendations for governments and European institutions.

The panel would not have possessed legislative, budgetary or operational authority. It could neither commit national forces nor approve procurement. Its importance was political: Kallas wanted experienced figures, including Ukrainian voices shaped by active warfare, to challenge established assumptions about European defence planning.

The proposal lasted less than a week in public view. Italian and German reporting described dissatisfaction with the consultation process, including concerns that national governments had received insufficient notice. Separate accounts also pointed to disagreement over the proposed membership.

Those details have not been set out in formal statements by the governments concerned. The cancellation should therefore be understood as a confirmed institutional retreat whose complete diplomatic background remains partly undisclosed.

A dispute over authority

The episode reflects the unusual division of responsibility governing European defence. The High Representative is responsible for coordinating the EU’s common foreign and security policy, but member states retain control over their armed forces and most capability decisions. Major security choices remain dependent on agreement among national governments in the Council.

That makes consultation more than a procedural courtesy. A panel seeking to influence defence investment, military priorities or cooperation with non-EU partners must command confidence across capitals, particularly when its recommendations could affect national budgets and industrial interests.

At the same time, the speed of the rejection raises a broader question. Governments regularly call for Europe to become more capable and less fragmented, yet proposals that cross institutional or national boundaries can encounter resistance before their substance is examined.

There were also legitimate accountability questions surrounding the panel. Its full membership, detailed mandate, timetable and arrangements for publishing its work had not been disclosed before the launch was cancelled. Greater transparency at an earlier stage might have strengthened its credibility with governments, parliaments and the public.

The defence agenda continues

The blocked panel should not be confused with the EU’s existing defence instruments. Europe is already expanding joint procurement and industrial financing, including through the €150 billion SAFE mechanism. The recent decision allowing Canada to participate showed how European defence cooperation is extending to trusted partners through formal Council decisions and negotiated rules.

Work also continues on air defence, military mobility, maritime infrastructure, industrial production and support for Ukraine. These programmes move through established institutional channels and are unaffected by the cancellation of a non-binding expert group.

Nevertheless, the aborted launch carries a warning. Europe’s capability gaps are not caused only by insufficient spending. Fragmented procurement, competing national requirements, slow decisions and overlapping institutional roles also limit the value of available resources.

Kallas’s diagnosis therefore survives the failure of her proposed remedy. The immediate challenge is to design a process that combines urgency with national ownership, Ukrainian operational knowledge and democratic scrutiny. Unless that balance is found, Europe may continue to agree on the need for faster defence cooperation while disputing the machinery intended to deliver it.