Yesterday, at the Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in Palau, the EU has renewed its pledges towards international Ocean governance. Presenting a list of 44 commitments for the 2020-2022 period for an amount of almost €1 billion, the EU has brought forward its most important commitments ever offered during an Our Ocean Conference, in terms of value.
The Our Ocean Conference is a key moment for countries across the world, civil society, and industry to commit to concrete and significant actions to protect the ocean. The theme of 2022 edition is ‘Our Ocean, Our People, Our Prosperity’, and it draws global partners to identify solutions to sustainably manage marine resources, increase the ocean’s resilience to climate change and safeguard its health for generations to come.
Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, Virginijus Sinkevičius, said: “The sum the EU is committing today is significant, but not as significant as the role that the ocean plays for our very existence. It provides us clean air, regulates the climate, hosts a large part of biodiversity on Earth and is key for our economy. The ocean is bringing all these benefits to us and we need to protect it. Our future depends upon it.”
At the Our Ocean Conference, the EU has taken commitments covering all the themes of this international event: marine protected areas; tackling marine pollution; confronting the ocean-climate crisis; creating sustainable blue economies; advancing sustainable small-scale fisheries and aquaculture; and achieving a safe, just and secure ocean. The EU has also developed a commitment tracking tool to allow citizens to follow the progress of the implementation of the commitments.
The EU is conscious of the challenges facing the ocean and has put a strong focus this year for protecting and restoring it, for example by contributing to initiatives such as the One Ocean Summit (in February, Brest) and the forthcoming UN Ocean Conference (in June-July, Lisbon). The EU is also currently updating its International Ocean Governance Agenda to take into account in a comprehensive way ocean challenges and recent developments, but also opportunities presented by the European Green Deal.
The EU remains fully engaged in the Our Ocean process, and stands ready to assume its responsibility in relation to international ocean governance as a firm supporter of multilateralism.
Almost €500 million over the period 2021-2023 will go to research, development and innovation in seed funding (i.e. funding to start a business) for the Horizon Mission ‘Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030′. The ‘Mission Ocean’ will address the ocean and waters as one and play a key role in achieving climate neutrality and restoring nature. It will help achieve the EU objectives of protecting 30% of the Member States’ sea area as well as restore marine eco-systems, prevent and eliminate pollution by reducing plastic litter at sea, nutrient losses and use of chemical pesticides, and help the further development of a sustainable and circular blue economy.
The EU has also announced a contribution of €55 million over two years to strengthen marine environmental monitoring and monitoring of climate change, through its satellite monitoring programme, Copernicus, and in particular the WEkEO service that allows the international research community to access in one place all products describing the past, present and future of the earth system together with online tools for environmental science on cloud computing facilities.
Background
Originally launched in 2014, the Our Ocean Conference took place in the US in 2014 and 2016. Chile hosted it in 2015, the EU in 2017 (in Malta), Indonesia in 2018 and Norway in 2019. Throughout the six previous conferences, participants have made more than 1,400 commitments worth approximately $91.4 billion and protected at least five million square miles of ocean. This 7th edition, co-convened by President Surangel Whipps Jr. of Palau and the US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, is all the more important as it will help draw attention to one of the most ocean-dependent and climate change-prone regions.
A deal reportedly made by the United Kingdom to send some migrants for processing and relocation to the Central African nation of Rwanda, are at odds with States’ responsibility to take care of those in need of protection, the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said on Thursday.
In an initial response, UNHCR spelled out that it was not a party to negotiations that have taken place between London and Kigali, which it is understood were part of an economic development partnership.
According to news reports, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, has said the scheme costing around $160 million, would “save countless lives” from human trafficking, and the often treacherous water crossing between southern England and the French coast, known as the English Channel.
People fleeing war, conflict and persecution deserve compassion and empathy.
They should not be traded like commodities and transferred abroad for processing.
— UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency (@Refugees) April 14, 2022
“UNHCR remains firmly opposed to arrangements that seek to transfer refugees and asylum seekers to third countries in the absence of sufficient safeguards and standards,” said UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection, Gillian Triggs, describing the arrangements as shifting asylum responsibilities and evading international obligations that are “contrary to the letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention.”
UNHCR urged both countries to re-think the scheme, warning that instead of deterring refugees from perilous journeys, the externalization arrangements would only magnify risks, causing refugees to seek alternative routes, and exacerbate pressures on frontline States migrants are seeking to pass through.
While Rwanda has for decades generously provided a safe haven to refugees fleeing conflict and persecution, the majority live in camps with limited access to economic opportunities.
UNHCR underscored that wealthier nations must show solidarity in supporting Rwanda and the refugees it already hosts, and not the other way around.
“People fleeing war, conflict and persecution deserve compassion and empathy,” underscored Ms. Triggs. “They should not be traded like commodities and transferred abroad for processing”.
UNHCR said in its statement that the UK has an obligation to ensure access for asylum seekers – integrating those deemed to be refugees and safely returning to their country of origin, people with no legal basis to stay.
However, Britain is instead adopting arrangements that abdicate responsibility to others, thus threatening the international refugee protection regime that has stood the test of time and saved millions of lives over the decades.
Manage sanctuary
The UK has often supported UNHCR, providing important contributions that help protect refugees and support countries in conflicts, including Ukraine, the agency noted.
However, financial support abroad for certain refugee crises cannot replace the responsibility of States and the obligation to receive asylum seekers and protect refugees on their own territory – irrespective of race, nationality and mode of arrival, the UN agency stressed.
While UNHCR recognizes the challenges posed by forced displacement, it maintained that developed countries host only a fraction of the world’s refugees and have the capacity to manage asylum claims in a humane, fair and efficient manner.
No externalizing asylum
In the past, UNHCR has also spoken out against Australia’s migrant offshore processing policy, which involved redirecting people on the move to Nauru, a Pacific island, thousands of kilometres away.
UNHCR has made it clear it does not support the externalization of asylum by countries, including measures taken to transfer asylum-seekers and refugees to other nations, with insufficient safeguards to protect their rights, or where this leads to the shifting rather than the sharing of responsibilities to protect them.
Sixteen years after its introduction, the restriction on the maximum volume of liquids in the hand luggage of airline passengers has been lifted for the first time by Shannon Airport in Ireland. The rule has been inconvenient for passengers since 2006, and repealing it in one place raises hopes that it will soon happen at other airports around the world.
Why did the rule for 100 ml of liquids appear?
An investigation in 2006 revealed that there were plans to blow up several planes over the Atlantic. All scheduled flights took off from London’s Heathrow Airport and flew to airports in North America. According to information revealed at the time by the British Guardian, the organizers of the attacks planned to import all the necessary ingredients for the explosive mechanisms, passing them through security checks. The liquid components were disguised as soft drink bottles, and the idea was to assemble and activate the explosive devices on board.
After the case became known, authorities at airports around the world imposed new restrictions on passengers’ hand luggage to thwart similar attempts in the future. One of these rules was the restriction that all liquids in hand luggage should be in packages of a maximum of 100 ml and placed in a separate transparent bag.
How is the repeal of the rule possible?
The answer is in the introduction of new technologies in the security clearance zone. Shannon Airport is investing $ 2.7 million in a new baggage scanning system that eliminates the need to place liquids in a transparent bag for inspection. The limit on the maximum volume of 100 ml of liquids has also been lifted, as the only condition for those traveling from this airport is that the liquids enter the hand luggage bag.
Now all items in hand luggage, including liquids and electronics, can be scanned and checked for explosive devices without passengers having to take them out of their luggage.
Will other airports follow suit?
Since the technology already exists and has been introduced at one airport, this is expected to gradually happen at other airports around the world.
Although it is not possible to predict a specific date in which this will become a reality, the British newspaper “Independent” said that by December 1, 2022, all major airports in Britain must have installed the new system.
Mariia Shostak, a 25-year-old woman living in the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, started having contractions on 24 February, the day the Russian Federation launched a military offensive in Ukraine, and gave birth amid the sounds of air raid sirens.
She describes the harrowing conditions she endured, bringing a new life into a world of sudden and extreme danger.
“I had a complicated pregnancy, and I went to the maternity hospital early so that the child and I would be under medical supervision.
When I woke up on 24 February, my phone’s screen was full of messages from relatives. Even before reading them, I realized something had happened.
The same morning, I had light contractions and, in the afternoon, we were evacuated to the basement shelter for the first time. It was scary. At night, I did not sleep.
The contractions intensified, and the news did not give peace
The contractions intensified, and the news did not give peace.
In the early morning of 25 February, a doctor examined me and told me that I would give birth that day. I called my husband at home to come.
A trip that normally takes 20 minutes took almost four hours because of queues at the gas station, shops, and the pharmacy.
Mariia Shostak’s baby son, Arthur, in the basement of a maternity hospital in Kyiv, where Mariia and other new mothers and their families took shelter.
I was lucky with the birth – it did not happen in the basement though some women gave birth in a room set up for this purpose.
I started in the delivery room but had to be transferred to the operating room for a Caesarean section. Later, when air raid sirens went off, the medical staff wanted to evacuate me to the basement, but I refused.
Because of the pain, I couldn’t even speak, let alone go anywhere. The rest of the time I was disconnected from the outside world, which was probably the only time I forgot about the war.
Fear, fatigue, and pain
After the operation, I was in intensive care for several hours, no longer on anaesthesia. I was worried because I didn’t know where the baby and my husband were.
Meanwhile, another air raid siren sounded, and I decided to go down to the basement. I was in a disposable shirt, without shoes, in a wheelchair, holding a urinary catheter.
I was covered with a blanket and taken to the shelter, where I first saw my son. We named him Arthur.
I felt fear, fatigue, and pain. The day after surgery, I went up to the maternity ward and back down to the basement several times a day. Again and again, the air raid siren sounded.
Exhaustion blunted the fear until a projectile hit a high-rise building we could see from our window. I managed to sleep for an hour or two a day. We spent most of the time in the basement sitting in chairs. My back hurt from sitting, and my legs are still swollen as a pregnancy complication.
My husband, Yurii, helped, taking care of me and the newborn. Medical staff organized meals in the bunker and later provided beds.
They helped put the baby to the breast, shared medicine for babies, held my hand when I had a hard time walking.
I feel safe in the capital – there are enough shelters and timely information is coming from the authorities. My husband arranged a corner for us in the basement of our house to stay.
I was born and raised here in Kyiv, I have no other home. We are not going to leave.”
Over the last years, we have witnessed events that we only know from history books. Our European culture has been confronted with what is happening. The ugly truth is that primary reactions are not alien to us. We are born with them; just over the years, we have learned to suppress primitive emotions and behave properly because we live in society. We’ve learned to use common sense focused on negotiation, compromise and agreements. In political language – this is diplomacy. In legal language – these are out-of-court procedures or mediation.
As we all know: “Even the worst agreement is better than the best court decision.” – a well-known statement among lawyers. Then why do legal professionals still avoid mediation? Is the problem in legislation, or is it in our agreement culture?
According to Article 1 of Directive 2008/52 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2008 OJ (L 136), its main objective is “to facilitate access to alternative dispute resolution and to promote the amicable settlement of disputes by encouraging the use of mediation and ensuring a balanced relationship between mediation and judicial proceedings.”
Since 2008, many studies and analyses have been carried out, and all of them show that the practical application of the Directive is far from the objectives set. Some of the studies that should be noted are:
“Quantifying the Cost of Not Using Mediation – a Data Analysis” (The 2011 Study and “The 2014 Rebooting Study”, both commissioned by the European Parliament. These studies estimated that if all cases in the EU went to mediation first, and the procedure succeeded in 50% of cases, the average number of days saved would be 240 days; if mediation succeeded in 70% of the cases, time savings would increase up to 354 days. As to cost savings: money savings per single dispute were multiplied by the number of disputes in the EU annually, resulting in savings of around thirty to forty billion Euros at a 50% success rate. Despite these impressive data, the European Parliament passed its Resolution of 12 September 2017 on the implementation of the EU Mediation Directive, saying that the objectives stated in Article 1 have not been achieved, as mediation is used in less than 1 % of the cases in court on average in the majority of Member States. Later in 2018, a Briefing requested by the JURI committee of the European Parliament was published, according to which we are witnessing the “EU Mediation Paradox”: “If increasing the use of mediation brings significant time and cost savings to the parties (as well as the judiciary and taxpayers), why were the Member States experiencing such low rates of mediation?”
The answer to this question is quite complex. The reasons for this paradox are not so much legal but psychological and cultural. My observations, from my experience so far, overlap with some of the conclusions of the cited studies and we can summarize them as follows:
1- Introduction of mandatory mediation is crucial for the successful implementation of mediation
It turns out that when Member states have the freedom to choose whether to apply mediation, they simply do not. And I believe it is an understandable psychological reaction. Italy is an example of the fact that after the introduction of mandatory mediation for a certain range of cases, the demand for voluntary mediation has sharply increased (150.000 – 200.000 mediation cases per year). In Bulgaria, we have had The Mediation Act since 2004, long before the adoption of the EU Mediation Directive. Since then, a small group of experienced mediators have been trying to break stereotypes and implement mediation at the national level. In 2018, there was a breakthrough with the Round table on Mandatory Mediation, organized by the Supreme Bar Council and the Center for Agreements and Mediation at the Sofia District and Sofia City Courts, which had a serious public response. But only in 2021, The Panel of Judges of the Supreme Judicial Council adopted a Concept for the Introduction of Mandatory Judicial Mediation in civil and commercial cases in Bulgaria.
2- Financial incentives for participation in the procedure / Relative sanctions:
Introduction of anything new is much easier to be accepted if tied to financial incentives or related sanctions. For example, in Bulgaria, the parties receive a refund of 50% of the state fee paid to the court if they successfully resolve the dispute through mediation. Romanian law provides a full refund of the court fee if the parties resolve a pending dispute through mediation. Similar provisions can be found in Hungarian law and also in Italy, where all acts and agreements resulting from mediation are exempt from state fees. As for sanctions, they seem to be the most sensitive topic at this stage because we risk affecting human rights and access to justice.
3- Increasing the criteria for licensing mediators
At the moment, I consider this a deficiency, as the criteria are too general, and this is why many judges in countries where mediation is not mandatory avoid the procedure because they doubt the effectiveness of the procedure and/or the qualifications of the mediators. Therefore, I believe that regulations regarding the requirements for mediators should be specified, and access to this profession should be tightened. Here we should mention the good example of Romania and their Mediation Council – a national body fully dedicated to promoting mediation, developing training standards, training of teachers who provide training, issuing documents proving professional qualifications of mediators, adoption of a code of ethics, as well as formulation of proposals for legislative acts.
4- Cooperation with Lawyers
Unfortunately, in many European countries, lawyers still avoid mediation, as they believe that out-of-court dispute resolution will deprive their income from litigation. In order to overcome this problem, it is extremely important that National Bar Associations work towards increasing the competence of lawyers. Lawyers need to be reassured that mediation will not throw them out of the market but will give them new opportunities as the participation of lawyers in the mediation procedure is crucial. Recall that even in Italy, legal practitioners opposed the changes, appealed legislation in court and even went on strikes.
5- Clarification of the obligations of Enforcement Agents
In 2021, The CEPEJ (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice), at its 36th plenary meeting, adopted a Mediation Awareness and Training Programme for Enforcement Agents, which aims to ensure the efficiency of the Judicial Referral to mediation. I fully share the opinion stated in the Guidelines of the Council of Europe’s recommendation on enforcement, according to which the enforcement agent’s role should be clearly defined, by national law, in order to avoid confusion in competencies and procedures. Enforcement agents are expected to take on the role of “post judicial mediator” during the enforcement stage. But the imposition of this role must be communicated in detail and in advance. Otherwise, we risk the opposite effect of which enforcement agents might withdraw from mediation, just like other legal professionals mentioned above.
6- Improving the legal culture of society
The introduction of European regulations and legislation, in general, is moving from top to bottom, which is normal. But this often leads to a problem with their implementation in practice. In my experience, I always take the opposite approach – individualize the problem in its infancy and formulate a solution. For example, I think we cannot talk about mandatory family mediation if we have not made progress in solving the problem of domestic violence. Issues need to be prioritized, especially in countries with a lower standard of living, as well as in societies whose culture is initially more militant.
In conclusion, it turns out that, even if we have a great regulatory framework that aims to make our lives easier, regulations will be inapplicable in practice until we apply an individual bottom-up approach – starting with individuals, through legal professionals up to national and European institutions.
So, do we fear mediation? Not anymore. But do we have an agreement culture? Not yet.
In a resolution on 7 April 2022 about the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny, the European Parliament condemned the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Item 6 of the resolution states:
(See full resolution at the bottom of the article):
“Condemns the role of Moscow Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, in providing theological cover for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who signed a letter condemning the aggression and expressed their grief over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people, calling for an end to the war.”
In parallel, priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate decided to appeal to the Cathedral of the Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against the Russian Patriarch Kirill for “committing moral crimes”. Priests of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine demand an international tribunal for the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill.
The statement of the priests was published by Fr Andrei Pinchuk on his Facebook page.
Excerpt:
“Today, when Patriarch Kirill of Moscow frankly supports Russia’s war of conquest against Ukraine, we, the priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, have decided to appeal to the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches with a lawsuit against Patriarch Kirill.
Our main accusations:
1. Cyril preaches the doctrine of the “Russian world”, which does not correspond to Orthodox teaching and should be condemned as heresy;
2. Kirill committed moral crimes by blessing the war against Ukraine and fully supporting the aggressive actions of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine.
We hope that the Council of Primates of the Ancient Eastern Churches will consider our appeal and make its fair decision,”
the appeal says.
See full resolution of the European Parliament below the video.
UATV interviewed on video a priest on the suit against Kirill
UATV, a Russian-language channel of the state foreign broadcasting of Ukraine, addressed to a wide foreign audience and designed “to convey to the whole world objective, relevant and interesting information from Ukraine and about Ukraine the first hand”, launched an interview with a high ranking orthodox priest. The video is presented with the following message:
“Russian World” – an ideology that laid the foundation of Russian hatred of Ukraine. Ukrainian priests of Moscow Patriarchate “filed a suit” to the highest church judicial authority calling to condemn the doctrine spread by the Russian Orthodox Church and its heretical leader – Patriarch Kirill
See the full resolution here:
(if reading the article in our non-English site, find below an automatic translation of the resolution)
Increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexey Navalny
European Parliament resolution of 7 April 2022 on the increasing repression in Russia, including the case of Alexei Navalny (2022/2622(RSP))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia,
– having regard to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders,
– having regard to the Constitution of the Russian Federation,
– having regard to the statement by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell of 28 March 2022 on the Russian independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta,
– having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 22 March 2022 on the ruling to extend Alexei Navalny’s politically motivated imprisonment by an additional nine years,
– having regard to the statement by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights of 24 March 2022 expressing appreciation for the courageous work of journalists and human rights defenders, including those from the Russian Federation and Belarus,
– having regard to the statement by the Media Freedom Representative of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe of 3 March 2022 on the serious infringement of the right to freedom of expression and media freedom in Russia in the context of the country’s military attack against Ukraine,
– having regard to the statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the latest developments in Russia and Ukraine,
– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas the Russian Federation has repeatedly breached international law and its international commitments and has launched an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and perpetrated massacres against its citizens; whereas legislative restrictions, media bans, the criminalisation of independent reporting and free opinion, and other political prosecutions have reached a totalitarian scale in recent months, resulting in the disintegration of independent and pluralistic civil space in Russia;
B. whereas the Russian regime has intensified, in an unprecedented manner, its crackdown on peaceful protesters, independent journalists and bloggers, human rights defenders and civil society activists in an effort to silence any criticism of and opposition to its illegal, unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine; whereas thousands have fled Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution; whereas this crackdown has had a devastating effect on the lives and freedoms of minorities, LGBTQI+ persons, women, and all people branded by the government and society as deviating from the behavioural or normative rules and expectations imposed or for criticising the regime and the policies of the Russian authorities;
C. whereas fundamental human rights, including freedom of association and freedom of expression, are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as in numerous international legal instruments to which Russia has committed itself; whereas the Russian authorities are responsible for years of systematic propaganda campaigns against Ukraine, Europe and liberal democratic values, culminating in the eradication of any vestiges of a vibrant, politically active and independent civil society;
D. whereas since 24 February 2022, Russian authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 15 400 peaceful anti-war protesters across the country, subjecting some to severe ill‑treatment and other human rights violations; whereas more than 60 criminal cases have already been brought since then;
E. whereas numerous laws imposed over the past few years, such as the ‘foreign agents’ law and its variations, the regulation of and adjudication over so-called ‘extremist organisations’ and countless decrees by the regulator responsible for media oversight (Roskomnadzor) have been used by Russian authorities for their concentrated crackdown on independent civil society and media active in Russia, targeting in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs), human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists, and activists of ethnic and cultural minorities; whereas the imposition of all of this legislation, regulation and judicial and administrative burdens is forcing civil society actors to refuse foreign funding, engage in self-censorship and reduce both their public visibility and their activities for fear of state retaliation;
F. whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Parliament amended the Criminal Code to impose a penalty of up to 15 years in prison for spreading allegedly ‘fake’ information about the war in Ukraine; whereas on 22 March 2022, the law was broadened to criminalise the sharing of ‘fake news’ about any activities of Russia’s official bodies abroad; whereas on 4 March 2022, the Russian Duma banned demonstrations against the war in Ukraine; whereas the Russian legal reforms have introduced administrative and criminal offences for Russian nationals and legal entities who call for international sanctions against the Russian state, its nationals or any Russian legal entities;
G. whereas Russian authorities have forced several independent media outlets to suspend their activities, close down, or move their activities abroad, while blocking access to others in the context of growing internet censorship, control and isolation, thereby depriving the Russian population of unbiased information about Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war crimes being committed there in the name of the Russian Federation; whereas these include, most notably, the radio station Echo of Moscow, the TV station Dozhd and the newspaper Novaya Gazeta; whereas the authorities have blocked foreign social media in Russia and blacklisted Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, labelling it as ‘extremist’;
H. whereas since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, hundreds of journalists, human rights defenders, activists and others have left Russia due to the drastically increased risk of arbitrary arrest and prosecution, including after President Putin referred to those standing up against the war as ‘national traitors’ and a ‘fifth column’;
I. whereas on 16 March 2022, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to revoke the membership of the Russian Federation in the Council of Europe, effective immediately; whereas the Russian Federation, for its part, decided to leave the Council of Europe on 15 March 2022, depriving Russian citizens of the protection enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights and denying them access to judicial remedies before the European Court of Human Rights;
J. whereas Alexei Navalny, a Russian lawyer, opposition politician and anti-corruption activist, and laureate of the 2021 Sakharov Prize, was arrested in January 2021 and has been in prison since February 2021, where he has been serving an arbitrary, politically motivated sentence and has been repeatedly subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; whereas the EU has condemned the poisoning and politically motivated imprisonment of Alexei Navalny in the strongest possible terms, imposed targeted sanctions and continues to demand an independent investigation into his poisoning;
K. whereas on 22 March 2022, Moscow’s Lefortovski Court, following an extraordinary session staged in a prison camp and thus outside regular court facilities, sentenced Alexei Navalny to nine years in a maximum security prison and issued him with an administrative fine of RUB 1,2 million (approximately EUR 12 838); whereas this judgment clearly contravenes international law and the Russian Constitution and is as unlawful, arbitrary and politically motivated as the previous judgment;
L. whereas a number of activists have been threatened with or subjected to arrest and prosecution for supporting or working with Alexei Navalny or for supporting his ideas, like the smart voting strategy; whereas they were accused and prosecuted for such support based on the retroactive application of new laws or administrative decisions on the basis of their social media statements, and many of them have left Russia after facing criminal charges; whereas Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation was labelled ‘extremist’;
1. Condemns the Russian regime’s domestic repression, which has worsened in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; demands that Russian authorities stop the harassment, intimidation and attacks against all anti-war protesters, independent civil society organisations, NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, as well as women’s rights, LGBTQI+ and environmental activists in Russia; expresses its solidarity with the democratic forces in Russia committed to an open and free society, and underlines its support for all individuals and organisations which have been the target of attacks and repression;
2. Condemns the neo-totalitarian, imperialist ideological stance cultivated by the Russian Government and its propagandists; emphasises that the assault against democracy and disregard for the rights of other nations has paved Russia’s path towards despotism, international aggression and war crimes; underscores that an undemocratic Russia is a constant threat to Europe’s security and stability;
3. Deplores Russian legislation, including on ‘foreign agents’, the changes to the Criminal Code introduced on 4 March and 22 March 2022, and the Mass Media Law, which are used to engage in judicial harassment against dissenting voices in the country and abroad and to undermine independent media; underscores that these developments are in blatant contradiction with the commitments Russia has voluntarily undertaken under international law and written into its own Constitution;
4. Denounces the continuous and increasing censorship by Russian authorities, including of the internet, and urges them to immediately put an end to their control and censorship;
5. Condemns Russian authorities’ behaviour in persecuting the mothers of Russian soldiers and their established organisations, depriving Russian parents of information on the whereabouts of their children and refusing to cooperate with Ukrainian authorities in order to return the remains of Russian soldiers killed in action;
6. Condemns the role of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, for providing theological cover for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; praises the courage of the 300 priests of the Russian Orthodox Church who have signed a letter condemning the aggression, grieving over the ordeal of the Ukrainian people and asking to “stop the war”;
7. Strongly condemns the imprisonment of the Sakharov Prize laureate Alexei Navalny and reiterates its call for his immediate and unconditional release, as well as of the hundreds of other Russian citizens baselessly detained merely for having the courage to demonstrate in favour of democracy and peace or to improve their rights, including the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; calls on the Russian authorities to improve conditions in prisons and detention facilities in order to meet international standards; considers Alexei Navalny’s humanitarian, health and safety situation a priority concern for the EU; calls on the Russian authorities to take all necessary measures to fully secure his rights during his unlawful detention; condemns the fact that the trial against Alexei Navalny did not respect his right to a fair trial and reiterates its call for a transparent investigation into the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, without delay;
8. Considers the repression against Alexei Navalny, his supporters, the media and civil society, all intended as part of a prelude to Russia’s criminal war of aggression, and reiterates that political pluralism and free media are the best safeguards against and obstacles to international aggression by an undemocratic government; considers that our efforts to support freedom of opinion and the media for Russian citizens are an intrinsic part of our efforts to combat the war and aggression in Ukraine;
9. Forcefully condemns the decisions by Russian courts leading to the closure of International Memorial and the Memorial Human Rights Centre, together one of Russia’s oldest and most prominent human rights organisations and a Sakharov Prize laureate; condemns the continued warnings by Roskomnadzor against Novaya Gazeta concerning censorship and alleged violations of the ‘foreign agents’ law, resulting in the newspaper’s announcement to cease operations until the end of the war in Ukraine; equally deplores the Russian Prosecutor-General’s request for Roskomnadzor to restrict access to Echo of Moscow and Dozhd due to their coverage of the war in Ukraine; commends the role played by these outlets, as well as so many other independent organisations and news outlets that have since been closed down, in uncovering the truth and providing facts about the crimes of the Soviet regime and the Russian Government, as well as their commitment to human rights; calls for an end to the systematic repression of journalistic institutions and independent media, which constitute the fundamental pillars of freedom and democracy;
10. Calls on the UN Human Rights Council to investigate in full and as a matter of urgency the abuses of the right to information and freedom of expression perpetrated by the Russian regime;
11. Expresses deep concern over how the crackdown on Russian civil society, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, sexual and reproductive health and rights activists and LGBTQI+ communities is further exacerbating the situation of already vulnerable and targeted groups in the country;
12. Reiterates that the free and independent work of civil society organisations and the media is a cornerstone of a democratic society; calls on Russia, therefore, to establish a clear legal framework as well as a safe environment for civil society organisations, protesters, media and political actors in line with Russia’s Constitution and international obligations and with international human rights standards, enabling them to carry out their legitimate and useful work without interference; stresses the need to guarantee efficient legal recourse for protesters, civil society activists and journalists whose fundamental rights have been violated;
13. Calls on the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Member States to closely monitor the human rights situation in Russia, to provide emergency assistance and to increase support for the civil society, independent NGOs, human rights defenders and independent media which remain active in Russia, including sustainable and flexible financial assistance; calls on the EU Delegation and the Member States’ representations in Russia to publicly show solidarity with those persecuted;
14. Urges the Commission and the Member States to strengthen protection for the rights and physical integrity of activists, independent journalists and human rights defenders targeted by the Russian authorities’ repression, and to provide them with emergency visas to enable them to leave the country and find temporary shelter in the EU, as well as to allow threatened or banned Russian NGOs and media to immediately continue their work from EU territory if needed;
15. Calls on the VP/HR and the Council to make effective use of the EU’s global human rights sanctions mechanism and impose restrictive measures on all Russian officials involved in the crackdown against independent civil society and media and peaceful protesters, as well as in this latest case against Alexei Navalny;
16. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to prevent and counter the spread of disinformation, including propaganda, and strengthen independent media; welcomes, therefore, the development of specific platforms and news in Russian and Ukrainian; calls for EU strategic communications to be improved and for an exploration of effective ways to counter war propaganda originating in Russia from outlets such as Rossija, Channel One Russia and NTV, which disseminate content approving of the war of aggression and misinforming people about it; calls on the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS to continue to enhance alternative online Russian-language information on the unfolding developments to counter disinformation, to continue to ensure that public statements from the EU and the Member States are translated into Russian and to address Russian-speaking audiences and platforms;
17. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to host banned media teams in the EU and to develop a joint platform for media in exile, as well as to support technologies that enable people to use the internet to exercise their fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of information and expression, and to support the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law, by establishing technological means to circumvent communication surveillance and the blocking of websites and applications in Russia, including low-tech via M-waves, a VPN Russia platform, anonymisation networks and satellite TV;
18. Calls on the EU Delegation and national diplomatic representations in Russia to closely monitor the situation on the ground and how trials are handled and to offer those concerned any support that they may need, including direct financial assistance to pay for lawyers and experts; calls on all governments to refuse any future extradition requests for Russian nationals for offences under the Criminal Code and the Code of Administrative Offences;
19. Urges the Member States, the Council and the Commission to secure humanitarian status and create safe migration possibilities for threatened Russian opposition, civil society and media representatives, including securing opportunities for them to enjoy long-term residence and work in the European Union; calls on the Member States to devise a mechanism to protect Russian soldiers who decide to defect; calls on financial institutions, banks, credit card companies and government authorities to introduce screening procedures for the tailored application of sanctions against Russian citizens in the EU in order to allow opposition activists, independent civil society and media representatives to retain access to their financial assets necessary to secure their existence in the European Union;
20. Recalls that academic and cultural collaboration at an individual level, even in times of conflict, may help to strengthen pluralistic voices in anti-democratic circumstances and serve as a basis for facilitating the re-establishment of relationships after the conflict; underlines that the Russian scientific community has been a primary target of repression by Putin’s regime;
21. Stresses the strategic value of the input of Russian academics who oppose the war in order to better analyse Putin’s regime and how to counter it; calls for an EU strategy to allow Russian students and professors to officially continue their studies and work in European universities, particularly in humanitarian disciplines, and to receive their corresponding diplomas;
22. Asks the EEAS, the Commission and the Member States to mainstream human rights and civil society consultation across all dialogues between the EU, its Member States and Russia, and to abide by their commitment to gender mainstreaming;
23. Calls for the EU and the Member States to continue to engage with the people of Russia and with Russian civil society in exile; urges the EU to demonstrate its readiness to support Russian civil society in its efforts to build a democratic Russia, and to welcome a democratic and responsible Russia back into the international community;
24. Calls for the EU to appoint a special envoy for a democratic Russia, who should be responsible for relations with the Russian people, in particular with democracy defenders in exile and those who have remained in Russia and want the country to return to the path of democracy;
25. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the EEAS, to help establish and support a Democratic Russia Hub for continuous dialogue with the democratic Russian community, in particular the anti-war committee established by Russian democratic opposition activists, in order to provide direct communication with the Russian people, to develop together with civil society an EU strategy for a future democratic Russia, to improve the integration of new emigrants from Russia through educational programmes, and to organise annual EU summits with democratic Russia in exile;
26. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to take coordinated action with like-minded countries to raise awareness of and push back against the restrictions of fundamental freedoms and human rights by the Russian authorities, including through high-level and public interventions, coordinated démarches, sustained scrutiny at international and regional human rights forums, as well as regular human rights impact assessments to ensure that engagement with Russia does not undermine human rights objectives and does not contribute, directly or indirectly, to human rights violations;
27. Notes that according to the Levada Center, 83 % of Russians support Putin’s war in Ukraine, while the percentage of Russians who say the country is moving in the right direction has risen from 52 % to 69 %, the highest level ever recorded since 1996; applauds, in this regard, those brave individuals who openly protest and oppose Russian imperialism in its newest form – the invasion of Ukraine – despite the brutality of the rioting policy, as well as media and social pressure; urges EU citizens, nevertheless, not to equate all Russian citizens with the brutal actions of their leadership and military in Ukraine; calls on the Commission and the Member States to support and protect the critical voices within the Russian diaspora who are facing threats from Russian authorities; condemns rallies organised by Russian diasporas in support of the war or in protest against the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees;
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.
SOTA telegram channel Russian Police attends antiwar concert
Russia: the AntiWar concert of pianist Alexei Lyubimov and Yana Ivanilova was attended by police officers
SOTA Telegram Channel reports that a concert “Songs against Time” based on compositions by Valentin Silvestrov was being held at the Rassvet Culture Centre. The event was visited by the police, allegedly following a bomb threat, and was disrupted. This was reported by one of the audience.
Freedom of Religion or Belief in North Korea is certainly not a “boring” issue, even if it might be frustrating. The Member of the European Parliament Mr. Bert-Jan Ruissen, an expert on the subject, has accepted to be interviewed by The European Times.
The European Times: Mr Ruissen, on 30 March, you organized a conference about religious freedom in North Korea at the European Parliament. Why such an event now?
MEP Bert-Jan Ruissen (ECR – Netherlands)
We have been in touch with the London-based NGO Korea Future in the autumn of 2021 and during our talks we discussed Korea Future’s new Report on religious freedom in North Korea. The idea was raised to bring this report under the attention of a greater public in Brussels through a conference in the European Parliament in March 2022. Not much attention has been paid to the situation of religious freedom in the DPRK since years, so the release of the new report was for us a good occasion to put the issue on the agenda again.
The European Times: On 7 April, the European Parliament adopted a resolution about the human rights situation, including the persecution of religious minorities. Why are Christians considered “enemies of the state” and what are the consequences of such an infamous label?
According to the report, DPRK’s Ministry of State Security proactively gathers information on perceived threats to North Korea’s political system, with a focus on those of domestic origin, which includes Christians. The hardcore of Kim-dynasty’s policy is the total submission to and the unconditional glorification of the ‘ divine’ Kim Jong Un (as well as his late father and late grandfather). Christians obey the King of Heaven and do not want to be involved in the divine glorification of an earthly atheist leader. They are therefore accused of undermining the political system and being an existential threat to it. The authorities persecuted religious believers on a variety of charges, including religious practice, religious activities in China, possessing religious items such as Bibles, contact with religious persons, attending religious services, and sharing religious beliefs. Christians and other religious adherents reportedly suffered from arbitrary surveillance, interrogation, arrest, detention, and imprisonment, punishment of family members, torture, sexual violence, forced labour and execution. For more information, I would like to refer to the aforementioned report.
Question: What are the main features of religious persecution that were highlighted by the resolution?
The resolution states that the DPRK regime is systematically targeting religious beliefs and minorities, including Shamanism, Korean Buddhism, Catholicism, Cheondoism and Protestantism. Examples of such systematic targeting include the execution of some non-foreign Catholic priests and Protestant leaders who did not renounce their faith and being purged as ‘American spies’. The resolution also refers to the songbun system (the nation’s surveillance/security system), according to which religious practitioners belong to the ‘hostile’ class and are considered enemies of the state, deserving ‘discrimination, punishment, isolation, and even execution’. The text mentions that documentation from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) shows that followers of Shamanism and Christianity are especially vulnerable to persecution. It also stresses that there have been reports on the severe repression of people involved in public and private religious activities, including arbitrary deprivation of liberty, torture, forced labour and execution and that kwanliso (political prison camps) remain operational because they are fundamental to the control and repression of the population.
The resolution condemns the severe restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, information, peaceful assembly and association, as well as discrimination based on the songbun system, which classifies people on the basis of state-assigned social class and birth, and also includes consideration of political opinions and religion. The parliament is deeply concerned about the systematic violations of freedom of religion and belief affecting Shamanism and Christianity as well as other religions in North Korea. It denounces the arbitrary arrests, long-term detention, torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence against and killings of religious people and urges the DPRK authorities to cease all violence against religious minorities and to grant them the right of freedom of religion and belief, the right of association and the right of freedom of expression. It further stresses the need to hold the perpetrators of these violent acts to account, including the Ministry of People’s Social Security and the Ministry of State Security which are instrumental in the persecution of religious communities;
Question: Pyongyang denied having been affected by the COVID. What is known about the impact of the pandemic in North Korea?
Given the closed nature of the country little is known about the actual prevalence of Covid-19 in the DPRK, with a government denying the presence of the virus in the country. The COVID-19 pandemic has however been used by the DPRK to further isolate the country from the outside world, resulting in exacerbated entrenched human rights violations and a negative impact on its people’s health. The DPRK has closed its borders to all external crossings to avoid the spread of COVID-19 and has not distributed any COVID-19 vaccines to its people
Question: What should be done to improve the human rights situation in North Korea?
On 22 March 2022, the EU imposed asset freezes and a travel ban under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime on two individuals and one entity in the DPRK. It is remarkable that in a country with so many reported human rights violations, so little people are being sanctioned. This is probably partially due to the closed nature of the country with limited to no access to foreign organizations. It is important to hold all perpetrators of grave human rights violations to account for their deeds, including their sanctioning, to pursue efforts to refer the situation in the DPRK to the International Criminal Court. Before that can happen, it is very important to collect evidence and documentation of gross human rights violations. It is therefore very important that the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korea, humanitarian organizations, and civil society get access to the country. The resolution also encourages the EU and the Member States to develop a strategy complementing the EU’s sanctions regime and taking into account the resumption of the political dialogue with North Korea (stalled since 2015) when the time is ripe, with a view to integrating human rights, denuclearisation and peace initiatives into its engagement with the DPRK.
Analysts are sure that the fall of the ruble is temporary. It will strengthen due to the sale of foreign currency by exporters
The Russian ruble weakened sharply in turbulent trading on Monday, wiping out some of the previous week’s gains after the central bank decided to ease temporary capital controls aimed at limiting the currency’s fall.
Late Friday, the central bank said it would lift a 12% fee for buying foreign currency through brokerage houses from April 11 and lift a temporary ban on the sale of cash foreign currency to individuals from April 18.
The ruble fell to 82.09 against the dollar at market open in Moscow from 71 rubles hit on Friday, the strongest reading since Nov. 11.
By 07:27 GMT, the ruble was down nearly 5% on the day to 79.90 against the dollar and 4.3% against the euro to 86.35.
The decision to waive the 12% FX transaction fee means that speculators will be able to trade again, Alor Brokerage said, adding that market participants are eager to take even small profits.
The ruble remains supported by the mandatory conversion of 80% of foreign exchange earnings by export-oriented companies, as well as high interest rates, despite the fact that the central bank unexpectedly cut its key rate from 20% to 17% last week.
Analysts at ITI Capital said Russia was generating about $1.4 billion in export earnings per day and the ruble could appreciate even more given Russian capital controls and reduced imports.
The rate cut by the central bank supported OFZ Russian government bonds. The Treasury Department said over the weekend that it would not borrow on local or external debt markets this year.
Finance Minister Anton Siluanov also said Russia would sue if the West tried to force it into defaulting on its sovereign debt.
The yield on 10-year OFZs, which move inversely with their prices, fell to 10.62% on Monday. This was the lowest since February 22, two days before Russia launched a special military operation in Ukraine, prompting unprecedented Western sanctions against Russia.
On the stock market, the dollar-denominated RTS index fell 4.5% to 1031.4 points, but the Russian ruble-based MOEX index rose 0.8% to 2614.0 points, supported by the ruble’s fall.
For years, scientists have sprayed oxytocin, known as the love hormone, on the noses of lions. The result: royal animals become much friendlier to their neighbors and less often roar against unknown lions.
The study, published in the journal iScience, could provide valuable help amid urban sprawl, forcing some animals to regroup in reserves.
“I’ve always loved lions,” said Jessica Burkhart, a neurologist and lead author of the study. After studying the brains of these animals in a laboratory, she wants to observe them in real life.
While cats have a reputation for being independent animals, lions do not have this trend. They live in groups, conquering and defending territories in the African savannah.
“Male lions, for example, leave their group when they are a few years old, meet other male individuals they do not know, and with whom they will form relationships for life,” explains Burkhart.
Such behavior shows that lions, unlike lone leopards or cheetahs, are biologically programmed to be social in certain situations, making them interesting animals for studying the effects of oxytocin, which strengthens social bonds. It appears in the brain of the mother, who looks into the eyes of her newborn child, causing a sense of happiness and well-being. Some therapists even suggest that couples with marital problems look each other in the eye to release oxytocin.
Similar effects have been observed in other species, such as humans and their dogs.
Jessica Burkhart and her colleagues worked at the Dinokeng Reserve in South Africa, using pieces of meat to lure lions.
To reach the brain directly, the hormone must be injected directly into their noses using something that looks like an old perfume bottle.
Researchers have found that the 23 lions exposed to the hormone were more tolerant of their peers, sharing their space, especially when they have a desired object.
“Oxytocin-exposed lions also no longer roared when listening to recordings of intruders roaring, unlike untreated specimens or others that were sprayed with saline alone,” said Jessica Burkhart.
This reduced aggression towards alien lions is particularly encouraging, according to the researcher, as oxytocin is known to have the opposite effect in humans: although it provokes positive feelings towards loved ones, it can also increase rivalry with outsiders.
According to Jessica Burkhart, the use of oxytocin may be useful in several scenarios.
First, he can help lions rescued from circuses or zoos in military zones, and then housed in reserves.
In addition, lions are facing a growing problem: cities are expanding and entering more and more of their territory. As a result, animal rights activists have to transport them to reserves where unknown groups are forced to communicate with each other. In this case, oxytocin can help prevent conflicts.
Finally, treatment could help return lions to the wild to better adapt to their new social environment, making Burkhart “more curious and less timid.”
However, the treatment also raises concerns that unscrupulous people – like zoo managers described in the documentary series “In the Kingdom of the Beasts” – could use it to allow visitors to pet animals. This practice has been strongly criticized by associations.
“There are indeed corrupt people. However, we can hope that oxytocin will help more than it will harm,” she said.
