Usmanov and Fridman leave the blacklist as a fraught compromise delivers longer protection for more than 3,000 listings
The European Union has extended individual sanctions connected to Russia’s war against Ukraine for three years, replacing the previous six-month renewal cycle. The agreement protects more than 3,000 listings from repeated veto threats, but the removal of billionaires Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman has exposed difficult questions about political bargaining, transparency and the consistency of EU pressure on Moscow.
A longer horizon for EU sanctions
The Council’s decision, completed late on Tuesday, keeps the measures in force until 22 September 2029. They include asset freezes, travel restrictions and a prohibition on making funds or other economic resources available to listed people and organisations.
The sanctions cover more than 3,000 individuals and entities accused of undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence. The list includes senior Russian officials, military figures, companies and people whose economic or public activities the EU considers supportive of Moscow’s aggression.
Moving from six-month renewals to a 36-month period is a substantial institutional change. Individual sanctions require unanimity among the 27 member states. Under the previous timetable, every renewal gave national governments an opportunity to hold up the entire list while seeking changes or concessions.
The longer period should make the framework more predictable for banks, customs authorities and other bodies responsible for implementation. It also reduces the immediate risk that thousands of listings could expire together because of a dispute involving only a handful of names.
Two prominent names leave the list
The greater durability came with a politically contentious compromise. The implementing regulation published in the EU’s Official Journal removed Usmanov and Fridman from the annex containing sanctioned people and entities.
The Council said it had declined to renew three individual listings and one entity in total. Three deceased people were removed separately.
Usmanov and Fridman were sanctioned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Both disputed the grounds for their listings and pursued efforts to have the restrictions lifted. Their removal ends the EU-wide asset freezes and travel restrictions arising from this particular sanctions regime, although national measures and restrictions imposed by other jurisdictions may continue to affect them.
France had pressed for Usmanov’s removal, publicly describing the matter as one of national security. Several reports connected the request to efforts concerning French nationals imprisoned in Azerbaijan. Paris has not publicly confirmed the details of any such arrangement. Fridman’s delisting was also sought during the negotiations, amid separate legal and financial disputes involving his frozen assets.
That lack of public detail is significant. Restrictive measures interfere with property rights and freedom of movement, so listed people must be able to challenge them. Decisions must rest on defensible evidence and remain open to judicial scrutiny. Yet the same rule-of-law standard requires governments to explain why evidence once considered sufficient no longer supports a designation, particularly when delisting appears linked to unrelated diplomatic interests.
Baltic governments preserve national restrictions
The compromise did not produce a uniform European retreat. Latvia imposed national financial and entry restrictions on Usmanov and began preparing measures concerning Fridman. Estonia announced that it would apply national sanctions to both men.
Those decisions demonstrate the limits of the EU agreement. National restrictions can prevent entry or freeze assets within a particular country’s jurisdiction, but they cannot reproduce the reach of an EU-wide designation across the single market.
A widening patchwork could also increase the compliance burden on banks and businesses. An individual may no longer be listed at EU level while remaining subject to restrictions in particular member states or allied countries. Authorities will need to make the applicable rules clear and ensure that assets are not released where another valid legal restriction remains in force.
Durability does not remove the need for review
Ukraine had urged EU governments to maintain the listings, arguing that easing pressure while Russian attacks continued would send the wrong signal. Baltic opposition reflected a wider concern that politically negotiated exemptions could encourage future attempts to trade sanctions relief for unrelated national objectives.
The three-year renewal nonetheless prevents a much broader lapse that would have lifted restrictions from thousands of listed people and entities. For governments supporting the compromise, preserving the wider regime for a longer period outweighed the cost of the disputed removals.
That calculation may strengthen short-term unity, but it cannot replace careful oversight. A three-year duration should not mean that evidence remains unexamined until 2029. The Council can amend the list before then, and it should continue correcting weak designations, adding newly responsible actors and responding to court judgments.
As The European Times has previously examined, sanctions depend on national authorities to trace assets, inspect transactions, investigate evasion and prosecute breaches. Longer listings will have little effect if ownership structures remain opaque or enforcement varies sharply between countries.
The agreement therefore resolves one immediate institutional crisis while leaving a deeper credibility question unsettled. The EU has made most of its Russia sanctions more durable. It must now show that individual decisions are governed by evidence, due process and a coherent foreign-policy purpose rather than by whichever national demand carries the strongest veto threat.
